Re:The Surreal Horror of Pam
by p_l on Tuesday November 09, 2021 @05:25PM
(#29168347)
Efficiency (spawning setuid program for every line printed by ls -alv is a bit too much), and you don't want to make too privileged programs too (suid ls?)
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I mean the hypothetical program would have just dumped the whole file minus the sensitive bits.
Exposing a setuid program that prints the file would be more dangerous though. The result is the same (you can read /etc/passwd) except now you have a vector for gaining root access through an exploit to this setuid program.
And then you've reinvented /etc/shadow but worse. :)
see getpwnam, which was already public for years and linked by everything. it queries one record at a time.
getpwnam() gets its data by parsing /etc/{passwd,shadow}[0]. It isn't a magical system call that elevates the privileges of the calling program.
[0] assuming your nsswitch says so
yeah. agree, was merely pointing out the public interface for querying passwd records for the purposes of highlighting why said interface might be another reason to reconsider the proposed idea of a setuid shim that reads a read protected /etc/passwd that contains password hashes and returns only the public components.