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Re:liblinux: Architecture-independent access to Linux system... by toast0 on Tuesday November 09, 2021 @11:24AM (#29163774)
Here's an article about OpenBSD's efforts https://lwn.net/Articles/806776/

The basic idea is to make it harder for remote code execution bugs to result in useful abilities. Restricting access to syscalls to libc, and using adress randomization to make it hard to find libc makes it harder to do system calls when you take over a program.

Re:liblinux: Architecture-independent access to Linux system... by matheusmoreira on Tuesday November 09, 2021 @12:31PM (#29164599)
I see. That's really interesting. Looks like it is implemented by mprotecting the pages where the trusted code resides. The program's text segments are considered trusted by default so a freestanding C program that makes system calls directly should not be affected.

https://lwn.net/Articles/806863/

> For static binaries, the valid regions are the base program's text segment and the signal trampoline page.

I'm not sure but it looks like the BSD libc is some kind a special case? Surely this is not necessary? A compiler or language runtime should be able to somehow mark those segments with the appropriate permissions.