So all they have is your phone number, date when you've registered, and last time you've used it. If someone took over their servers, all they'd see are encrypted blobs and their destination. They have no reason to keep those blobs after they've been delivered.
This is exactly all the info they've previously reported to the courts. Example: https://signal.org/bigbrother/cd-california-grand-jury/
Last connection date: 1634169600000 (unix millis)
Account created: 1606866784432 (unix millis)People are killed over metadata.
An encrypted blob also isn't nothing. Encryption is not a silver bullet. With a stream of encrypted blobs, you can ascertain:
- Connections
- Frequency of communication
- Volume of communication (length of the blobs)
- IP addresses
- Receipt time on the target number
Etc.
1. You can see that my wife sends someone a message via Signal. 2. You can see a stream of data from Signal to Google. 3. You can see that an app on my phone receives a small amount of data from Google.
You can still pick out something, but the architecture tilts the statistics and widens the error bars on your results.
edit : root -> route :)) talk about a freudian slip :)))
They do have a registry, but it's not relevant to this order. When you send me a message, your phone sends Signal my phone number and an encrypted blob. Signal routes that to my phone and the server doesn't keep a long-term record of that. Thus, Signal-the-server has a record for the next many seconds at least containing the destination of a messsage. It does not have my profile name, your profile name or any way to connect your phone number to that message.
Signal running on my phone has enough state concerning you to decrypt the encrypted blob and see that it's from you.
Signal, the organisation, is in control of all the source code and could change the code to gain control of all the information Luxembourg is asking for. But the past is immutable. Noone can go back in time and retroactively store more data. Signal didn't log the destination phone number at the time and so it's not available now, Signal didn't transmit the profile names to the server and so it never arrived and could not be stored.
Luxembourg has the legal right to forbid people in its territory from using apps like Signal, though. But I doubt it would even try to that, because it's really difficult to write a scope that includes things like Signal messages and yet excludes things like messages that instruct and authorise your bank to transfer money.
You're never going to make abstract metadata like volume of messages and relationships completely anonymous, but that's essentially an opsec issue which Signal is trying to solve by normalizing it anyway: if all your communications are always encrypted all the time, and you constantly use them, then there's no discontinuity if you go from "I don't like advertisers" too "I am in possession of the panama papers" - it all looks the same.
Even here Signal works very hard. Signal doesn't know group memberships, all the group metadata is encrypted and acted on based on cryptography, so somebody who is apparently authorised to administrate a group kicked somebody out of it, and then they sent a message to the group. Who was that admin? What's the group's name? Who is in it? Who did they kick out? What was the message? All deliberately unknown to Signal.
Also all messages to people who agree to accept your messages in advance (so, most people's friends, and those whistleblower hotline type setups at newspapers) are anonymous to Signal. You've got proof you're authorised to send this message, so they don't need to care who you are and they don't ask your client who it is. They need to know who the message is for to deliver it, but that's all.