Apple is not a solution, it's a stop gap. They will still want a copy of the messages after it, and all your other data.

And the reason for the huge backlack, is that this stop gap will actually make it easier for them to request more afterwards, because the infrastructure, the proof of concept, will already be there and running. And it will cross to other providers: "see Apple does it, so clearly it's Signal that's being protective of criminals, we should impose them to do the same thing Apple did with no issue".

Who is this government that is not you and I and why should we cede any kind of goal to them in that case?

I simply disagree with the notion that I should be controlled and monitored by a third party just because someone else might do something evil.

We should always remember that power corrupts and definitions of evil change almost on a whim.

Has Apple announced that they're making iCloud end-to-end encrypted? It seems like people see the on-device scanning as a road to an "obvious" next step, but I'm not sure that Apple has announced that that's the next step. They might scan your device locally, and mine everything in the cloud for advertising purposes. They haven't said anything to the contrary, and their current terms of service allows it.

I could be missing something, but I did a quick search and all I see is news about them scrapping their once-encrypted backups at the request of the FBI.

Agreed. The general sentiment I perceived from HN at the time was that almost nobody was willing to accept Apple's CSAM scanning, even though CSAM had been confronted as an issue before the internet was widely available. I perceived a lot less room for opinions in favor of sacrificing a limited amount of privacy for greater public good, or similar. After the media finished its reporting on the subject, it seemed like there wasn't much more discussion about it, and Apple now seems poised to go forward with releasing its implementation of the scanning anyway at some unknown future date.

The arguments about slippery slopes and potential surveillance weren't as interesting to me as the opposing argument: that a very high level of privacy (not even an absolute level) carries consequences for a specific segment of society by the intrinsic nature of what is kept private, and in the name of protecting that segment of society, the tradeoff is not worth it.

There is also the idea that data on a hard drive can be as damaging to human livelihood as physical contraband, to the point that the vast majority of the world's legal systems, not just those of the U.S., have decided that the data should not exist under any circumstances. CSAM is one of the few classes of digital data that compels the creation of scanning systems for such data on a scale that isn't driven by political ideology, propaganda or similar. It's difficult to imagine how Apple would be obliged and driven enough to implement such a system out in the open and in the name of the public good if the publicly announced reasoning was to scan any other class of data (assuming that Apple can be trusted, at least).

It is driven by a moral panic - that the panic in question is about a very real issue doesn't change its underlying nature. So whatever measures are put in place this time, they'll be normalized and deployed when the next one happens.

This is like having a camera in your house, that does image recognition, and once it thinks it saw something illegal, sends the "something is happening at XY street" to the police. Does it help the government solve crimes? Sure. Is it creepy and intrusive, and not something anyone sane would accept? Yes.

I don't know why we accept the same things when we're talking about digital privacy.