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Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @05:08AM (#2886093)
I agree with him - it's impossible to remember a unique high-entropy password for every account. I disagree that password managers are the solution. They are a huge single point of failure both for getting locked out of accounts and for security breaches.

I think passwords are fundamentally broken as a security mechanism, once you take human psychology into consideration. We've spent decades trying to teach people to pick better passwords. That didn't work; people still pick stuff that gets cracked in minutes. And now, as Randall Munroe said, it turns out that the "better" passwords we taught people to use are actually very bad. Great, let's spend the next 3 decades teaching people to use long passphrases, and watch that fail too. Then we can start teaching them to stop sharing and reusing passwords (good luck).

A security token (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_token) is a fundamentally better solution to authentication. It's not perfect and it's not a panacea, as the RSA security leak/breach shows. But it's better than a completely broken paradigm. Once these tokens acquire enough compute power to perform challenge-response calculations internally, they will be very safe even at untrusted terminals. They've already become ubiquitous in places that really care about authentication on a large scale (like the military), and they should become ubiquitous everywhere. You can have several of them (one for banking sites, one for social...), to avoid single points of failure. They are reliable, and you know when you've lost one. A leaked password manager password, on the other hand, could have the attacker using your logins for months.

A technical solution is preferable to a solution which involves changing human behavior on a massive scale; that is just not going to happen.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by troyhunt on Monday August 15, 2011 @05:20AM (#2886110)
"A leaked password manager password, on the other hand, could have the attacker using your logins for months"

That's only half the story as without the password keychain (in the 1Password example), the master password itself it useless. So now you've got to extract a human memory-bound password AND compromise their machine / device / Dropbox to gain access to the strongly encrypted passwords.

I'm with you in wanting a better alternative to passwords, but for now password managers are the best mousetrap we've got. But it's not as easy to exploit as simply obtaining one password.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @05:27AM (#2886117)
And if their laptop (or smartphone - there are even worse security breaches possible with them) is rooted and keylogged, then both of these things will happen simultaneously. And they won't find out right away, either.

EDIT: the other problem (again, psychological) is that you can't require users to have a password manager, even if you think it's a good solution, which I personally don't. Your site is not aware if the password came from a manager or from a keyboard. But once you issue security tokens, they must be used. And often, it's not just the user's problem if someone has their password; once someone is in your network, privilege escalation is usually not far away.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by Vitaly on Monday August 15, 2011 @05:34AM (#2886130)
if your laptop is rooted and keylogged, you are going to loose access to all accounts you actually use anyway, which probably means the most important ones: your email, your bank, your openid. Oh, and you won't find out right away, either.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @05:46AM (#2886154)
Not precisely. Sure, with a session open on your computer and the token inserted, anyone controlling the computer controls the session. But once you close the laptop or take out the key, the access is gone (this is how it works with the most up-to-date challenge-response systems). And yes, you will find out soon, since the results of the recent active session will be all wrong. An attacker can't use the credentials at a later date. I am not saying this is perfect (no security will ever be), but it's stronger than long-term passwords, with or without a password manager.

Even for credentials for multiple sites stored on one token (which is less safe), you at least get the ability - even offline - to see what credentials have been provided to whom. It's just a fundamentally better authentication paradigm, although certainly not the solution to all the world's security ills.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by true_religion on Monday August 15, 2011 @09:18AM (#2886714)
If you're giving the computer, your cryptographic keys from your security token in order to start a session then a malicious program on a rooted machine will have access to them too.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by onemoreact on Monday August 15, 2011 @10:26AM (#2887007)
Good tokens don't work that way. Normally your giving out a 5-10 digit code that is valid for 30 seconds and can be compared with a secure server somewhere. Physical devices plugged into the machine often work the same way, but use a longer code that you don't need to enter. In either case the token never gives up it's private key's.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by acdha on Tuesday August 16, 2011 @08:37AM (#2890896)
No one is questioning that it's better, just whether it makes sense to conflate a still unfortunately hypothetical system with something immediately available. Until the US financial system starts taking security seriously, I can't force them to switch to token-based auth but I can start using a password manager.

I also find the distinction above almost meaningless for webapps: if an attacker has privileged access, you're screwed. Maybe they can't make actions while you're not logged in but they can hijaack the session and control everything you see each time you do login. Using a more trustworthy client is your only realistic option until banks start requiring one-time codes for every transaction.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by troyhunt on Monday August 15, 2011 @07:20AM (#2886312)
Ah, this is true but you've just made a very big leap from simply obtaining a password to now successfully installing a rootkit and key logger and obtaining both the keychain and password. We could go back and forth about the likelihood of this on a patched, virus protected machine (ok, there are still zero days), but we're starting to greatly reduce the probability as it is.

I'd love to see two factor auth or at least the option of RSA style tokens and we're gradually seeing that in some places but unfortunately we're still stuck with the status quo for the vast majority of sites for the foreseeable future.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @08:44AM (#2886580)
I don't disagree with that, but I am making a different point. Password systems, by their nature, require lots and lots of actions from users: making up passwords, resetting them when expired, making a keyfile and keeping it safe and backed up (if using a password manager), remembering a long and random master password, and the list goes on - e.g. remembering not to reuse passwords or use similar passwords. It's been proven over and over and over and over again that users will not do these things. It's not like password managers are new; they've been around for 15 years, and haven't made a dent. We can keep banging our heads against that wall, or we can give users a solution that doesn't depend on them doing and remembering dozens of technical actions. "This is the key to your bank account. Don't lose it, but if you do, call us." This can work.

And from a technical point of view, all password systems have a weakness of having long-term credentials - a stolen password can be used for months, at any time, until it expires. That part is not fixable.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by evandijk70 on Monday August 15, 2011 @06:02AM (#2886179)
Pokerstars, the biggest company offering online poker, has an optional RSA token you can use to login. This way, the users can pick their own solution
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by blahedo on Monday August 15, 2011 @11:24AM (#2887258)
So now we're carrying around 130 security tokens? Unless you're talking about this in conjunction with a password manager, all the OP's arguments apply to this too.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @12:04PM (#2887435)
The token would either have to work with a single-sign-on authority that would authenticate you to other parties (like OpenID, but hopefully easier to use), or it would contain multiple "authentication slots" for the parties that issue credentials. Both things already exist today, although I don't think they are very widely deployed. But certainly companies that deploy something like the RSA tokens have a company-wide single sign in working with them, and there is no reason for that to stay within one company. Both solutions are technically very different from a password manager.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by chadgeidel on Monday August 15, 2011 @03:52PM (#2888373)
I have several security token apps on my phone. I'm not saying that's the best solution, but it is a solution.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by eru on Monday August 15, 2011 @12:05PM (#2887437)
No. It's better. Because somebody can still your password by eavesdropping. But they can't still your token the same way. (Unless the cryptography used is seriously broken.)
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by pnathan on Monday August 15, 2011 @12:13PM (#2887478)
I've tried a password manager. The fact that losing one password would mean losing all of my passwords really bothered me.

It's not commonly talked about, but it's possible to have multipassword encryption. I wonder if a password manager out there supports it. (I think GPG can, so if you consider a test file & gpg a password manager... ;) )

One scheme: There'd be the "normal" login, which would be rotated, then another ultra-high-entropy one written down and locked in a safe somewhere. That way when you spaced out your password, it'd not be "whoops, just blew my credentials... all of them".

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by mseebach on Monday August 15, 2011 @01:11PM (#2887732)
Since it's only one password, and there's no maintenance overhead, write it down on a piece of paper, wrap it in tinfoil and seal it in an envelope. Stick the envelope in the bottom of your desk drawer. If you're afraid of losing the password in a fire simultaneously with you forgetting it, repeat for your mothers desk drawer.

Yes, if someone who knows you well physically targets you for your password, that person will likely succeed. But he would probably also succeed using this method: http://xkcd.com/538/

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by dredmorbius on Tuesday August 16, 2011 @12:44PM (#2891850)
So:

Use a password manager.

Export the saved passwords, print on paper, and put in a safe place.

Distribute encrypted versions of the passwords on various systems you use, with one very well known and recoverable password. Or encrypted against multiple passwords.

There's a risk, yes, but it's reasonable fungible.

And yes, actually, GPG is my password manager ;-)

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by mseebach on Monday August 15, 2011 @01:20PM (#2887792)
It would be rather interesting if a password manager could be token-secured in a way that would keep it safe on a rooted and keylogged machine.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by pavel_lishin on Monday August 15, 2011 @10:36AM (#2887050)
> You can have several of them (one for banking sites, one for social...), to avoid single points of failure.

Carrying a bag of security tokens around with me doesn't sound like a lot of fun - and they're still a single point of failure if you happen to get mugged by an idiot or fall in a puddle.

Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by yaakov34 on Monday August 15, 2011 @12:14PM (#2887480)
I am not suggesting a bag of tokens. I think I would like some segmentation (e.g. a banking token that I wouldn't necessarily carry with me everywhere). But that's a personal preference - the more tokens, the more security and reliability. A single token can be used to sign on to many services. That's a technology that exists today - e.g. the US military, which deployed tokens to just about all service members and civilian DOD personnel, certainly doesn't give people a bag of tokens for all the services they need to access. They use a single sign-on system. I don't know if someone has already deployed this for general users (like OpenID) - but it's certainly doable if someone thinks there is a market for it.
Re:I’m sorry, but were you actually trying to remember your ... by timwiseman on Monday August 15, 2011 @01:19PM (#2887789)
You have a good point and I think tokens are very useful for anything were security matters, but of course if you are really concerned about security you will use multifactor authentication (password + token, or token + biometrics, etc).