That's only half the story as without the password keychain (in the 1Password example), the master password itself it useless. So now you've got to extract a human memory-bound password AND compromise their machine / device / Dropbox to gain access to the strongly encrypted passwords.
I'm with you in wanting a better alternative to passwords, but for now password managers are the best mousetrap we've got. But it's not as easy to exploit as simply obtaining one password.
EDIT: the other problem (again, psychological) is that you can't require users to have a password manager, even if you think it's a good solution, which I personally don't. Your site is not aware if the password came from a manager or from a keyboard. But once you issue security tokens, they must be used. And often, it's not just the user's problem if someone has their password; once someone is in your network, privilege escalation is usually not far away.
Even for credentials for multiple sites stored on one token (which is less safe), you at least get the ability - even offline - to see what credentials have been provided to whom. It's just a fundamentally better authentication paradigm, although certainly not the solution to all the world's security ills.
I also find the distinction above almost meaningless for webapps: if an attacker has privileged access, you're screwed. Maybe they can't make actions while you're not logged in but they can hijaack the session and control everything you see each time you do login. Using a more trustworthy client is your only realistic option until banks start requiring one-time codes for every transaction.
I'd love to see two factor auth or at least the option of RSA style tokens and we're gradually seeing that in some places but unfortunately we're still stuck with the status quo for the vast majority of sites for the foreseeable future.
And from a technical point of view, all password systems have a weakness of having long-term credentials - a stolen password can be used for months, at any time, until it expires. That part is not fixable.
It's not commonly talked about, but it's possible to have multipassword encryption. I wonder if a password manager out there supports it. (I think GPG can, so if you consider a test file & gpg a password manager... ;) )
One scheme: There'd be the "normal" login, which would be rotated, then another ultra-high-entropy one written down and locked in a safe somewhere. That way when you spaced out your password, it'd not be "whoops, just blew my credentials... all of them".
Yes, if someone who knows you well physically targets you for your password, that person will likely succeed. But he would probably also succeed using this method: http://xkcd.com/538/
Use a password manager.
Export the saved passwords, print on paper, and put in a safe place.
Distribute encrypted versions of the passwords on various systems you use, with one very well known and recoverable password. Or encrypted against multiple passwords.
There's a risk, yes, but it's reasonable fungible.
And yes, actually, GPG is my password manager ;-)
Carrying a bag of security tokens around with me doesn't sound like a lot of fun - and they're still a single point of failure if you happen to get mugged by an idiot or fall in a puddle.
I think passwords are fundamentally broken as a security mechanism, once you take human psychology into consideration. We've spent decades trying to teach people to pick better passwords. That didn't work; people still pick stuff that gets cracked in minutes. And now, as Randall Munroe said, it turns out that the "better" passwords we taught people to use are actually very bad. Great, let's spend the next 3 decades teaching people to use long passphrases, and watch that fail too. Then we can start teaching them to stop sharing and reusing passwords (good luck).
A security token (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_token) is a fundamentally better solution to authentication. It's not perfect and it's not a panacea, as the RSA security leak/breach shows. But it's better than a completely broken paradigm. Once these tokens acquire enough compute power to perform challenge-response calculations internally, they will be very safe even at untrusted terminals. They've already become ubiquitous in places that really care about authentication on a large scale (like the military), and they should become ubiquitous everywhere. You can have several of them (one for banking sites, one for social...), to avoid single points of failure. They are reliable, and you know when you've lost one. A leaked password manager password, on the other hand, could have the attacker using your logins for months.
A technical solution is preferable to a solution which involves changing human behavior on a massive scale; that is just not going to happen.