Plenty of popular smart contracts do not do this though, and are fully immutable. Rather than updates, the developers upload a new version. Users can use the new version, or stay on the old one forever (the developers cannot delete it).
Regardless of which one, though, this is known ahead of time. A user (or, more likely, a community of users) can inspect the code and see to what extent the key holders can modify functionality.
Eth is immutable unless the central players lose too much money then they can roll it back
Imagine a first past the post election, where there is no official list of candidates (one simply writes in a name), but where a particular person has the position that they are always the first person to publicly recommend any candidate, and all voters hear this recommendation.
This would be a powerful position, even if that person was not eligible as a candidate, and even though everyone can vote for whatever candidate they want.
When in a position of significant power, even if this power is only of the form of one’s reputation and/or one’s influence on Schelling points, one has a responsibility to, when exercising this power, to take into account the effect it will have on others.
I don’t mean that he failed to do so. I imagine it must have been a difficult decision! And I do hold Vitalik in high regard.
But if one presents such a fork as being merely the the result of independent choices of each user, I think one is mistakenly omitting the power used by big names which promote one fork or another.
I don’t mean to say that this power being present is a problem that needs to be solved, making this power not present. I don’t think that is possible.
Like I said, I do largely agree with much of the “people are free to choose what fork they use” framing.
But while I think it is probably basically the best that can be achieved, I do think it is best to acknowledge that even without authority from things other than social influence and such, that there is still power through said social influence + Schelling point influence + etc. , and it is possible for this power to be misused (though I don’t claim that it was misused in this particular case).
In addition, I do think it seems prudent and good to avoid exercising this power unless the reason to use it is especially compelling (e.g. either part of an upgrade which basically the whole community has been expecting for a long time, or which has overwhelming support, or to handle something which , if not handled, could have an existential impact on the chain, or things like this) . (And, while I haven’t kept up with his latest writings and actions, I suspect he kind of agrees?)
The Ethereum developers convinced enough players of the crypto ecosystem to change what chain the name "Ethereum" refers to, not unlike a dns change (but to a large extent, done manually; there were humans in the loop to activate the hard fork). So wallets and exchanges changed the chain that the name "Ethereum" pointed to. Nodes migrated, and miners too. And it just happened that this fork was made specifically to revert a certain transaction.
Those that were left on the original chain had to pick another name for it, and build another branding. It was now called ETC instead of ETH, even though it was ETH that changed; ETC points to the old chain that used to be called ETH.
From the perspective of users, the transactions on ETH were truly reversed. Immutability is a mirage. (This is not necessarily a bad thing though.)
The developers of the clients do have a massive advantage here.
The Oculus Quest runs an Android fork for example. Are you saying if Google gets into VR Facebook will not be able to compete because of the fact they are using Android?
Bitcoin folks think the DAO fuckup perfectly illustrates Ethereums weakest link: the creator.
The weakest link is and always will be Mr Buterin. Satoshi did it correctly by disappearing
Hi Vitalik! I bought into your nonsense too. I’m even staking for you so whatever
I did not know that popular major projects were using immutable smart contracts.
This seems crazy to me, but it does at least address the question of centralization (while introducing massive bug risk).
I will grant you "simple", and maybe even "common"... but only because most people don't really understand decentralization and many of the ones who do don't care about it.
The "actual" way this happens, for the protocols and contracts that "actually matter" (certainly almost everything you would have heard of, as opposed to the long tail of tiny pet projects) is that, in the case that a bug is found, all of the users have to vote with their feet to move to and accept a new one.
Essentially, this is equivalent to saying "decentralized contracts simply aren't upgradable", but of course everything is upgradable if you accept the idea of people giving up on old software and using new software ;P.
(If this sounds familiar, it should be: this is in a very real sense similar to how Wireguard intends to deal with cryptographic breaks in its chosen cipher suite, as they aren't some centralized power able to upgrade everyone's computers remotely.)
(FWIW, there is something else you can do, but as it would be implemented by still more contracts that themselves might have bugs I don't consider it the answer here as it begs the question: you make a contract--hopefully a simpler one that is less likely to have a bug--that lets people vote on which contract is the current accepted one, assuming they can all have compatible APIs.)
So assuming that this is mainly an issue of people not understanding versus understanding and not caring (though you said there’s some of that) how is the Ethereum community going to get the word out so that this becomes a mainstream success versus mainly for speculation as it is now?
A common issue and one that I personally feel crypto in general suffers from is that neat tech isnt a a criteria on which most people flock to use something so what are the reasons end users need to know to be like ah yup I will drop my regular finance interactions for this or heavily augment them with this?
That said, I was paid in crypto the other day through a DAO. I was told how to submit a proposal to be paid, and then the funds were released through a vote within hours. It was transparent and the only hiccup was in needing a 70 cent bond fee to submit the proposal - it wasn't "controlled" in the usual sense of assigning a person to handle funds. So I already see some benefit in organizational structure.
To your point about transparency and trust for general transactions, I can see how that will be useful but don't you lose the ability that most trusted entities have now which is to roll back the transaction or correct a situation if fraud has occurred, given what I understand to be the finality of a contract? That said, I'm personally not really worried about making a transaction over say VISA's network but I am concerned about the end party I'm interacting with and I feel like crypto in general doesn't do well to address that, which I almost feel like is the real issue. I don't think I understand why people feel like it's an issue if they have to transact over a bigger central authority, perhaps I'm just too far removed from the group of people not served by classical finance.
That there are a large number of silly projects most people haven't heard of, or random tutorials on the web for getting started in crypto, that involve building contracts with backdoors is no different from any technology... most stuff isn't scalable or even slightly secure, even if the products from the biggest companies and used by the most people tend to be: like think how many websites have ubiquitous SQL or HTML injection attacks... only "by volume" (looking at the total number of such websites, irrespective of how much use they get) as "by weight" (looking at the websites you use during the course of a day by how much you use them) I bet almost none of them do.
Interestingly, this is actually almost doable in the context of a decentralized contract/computing system (with bug bounties to incentivise reporting[1]). You can include in the contract a interface where someone provides a proof[0] that a given cryptographic primitive is broken (eg a pair of colliding messages for a hash function), and the contract self-modifies to no longer trust that hash function.
The other half of the process - adding new primitives - is harder, since you want to prevent the addition of deliberately broken primitives. Obvious ideas include requiring a machine-checkable proof of hardness from some reasonable axioms (eg ZFC + P!=NP + whatever else), although most primitives don't have such proofs, and that doesn't look likely to change. Or requiring a quorum of reliable-seeming cryptographers to vouch for it (refutation: NIST endorsed Dual_EC_DRBG). A escrow period, where a new primitive is accompanied by a deposit that's paid out to anyone who breaks it, might help, but you'd need a seperate mechanism to prevent NOBUS backdoors (again, see Dual_EC_DRBG).
0: Ideally, you want a semi-zero-knowledge proof such that someone who has the option of putting in a tractable but significant amount of work to prove it (eg hash collision in 2^64 operations) will expect to be able to recoup their losses without getting sniped by front-runners, but once such a proof has been used, it's only a matter of time before front runners recover it and warn every contract.
For hash collisions, probably the easiest design is a two-phase model, where the reporter provides a zero-knowledge proof to commit to a particular hash collision, but then has to provide the actual collision to get the bounty. This can also work for preimages of a Schelling point like all-bits-zero. I'm not sure what a good Schelling point for typical public-key cryptography like curve25519 would be though; zero is almost always algebraicly special.
1: Cryptographic primitives are generally broken incrementally, so this incentivises even malicious parties to report a not-yet-exploitable break immediately (and thereby neuter it), rather than spend time trying to develop a working exploit (and risk both the large and small rewards disappearing out from under them because someone else was either honest or just less patient).
https://axieinfinity.com/terms/
Whatever blockchain (supposedly) giveth, Axie taketh away
There’s some fancy complex stuff where you can deploy 2 smart contracts with one being a proxy contract. Here, the proxy contract functions a lot like DNS does on the Internet. In this case, the contract CAN be (almost) fully updated but the proxy contract has to be setup at the very beginning. In like 80% or more of the smart contracts I’ve seen, smart contracts do not utilize proxy contracts for (almost) full updatability due to the extra complexity it adds, the less trustworthyness, and some other reasons.
Source: I am a smart contract developer.
It seems like for any contract that holds significant value it would be insane to make it immutable, particularly when it's written in a turing complete language like Solidity.
This part does talk about Ethereum itself. It's just a conflation that, I agree, the author probably didn't intend, but nonetheless demonstrates the lack of understanding.
Decentralized communities choose to use a different contract or not.
I’m not really sure the point of the goal posts here.
The point is smart contracts. They are code, and they have to get updated if there are bugs. How do they get updated? Well, in the simple (and common) case somebody holds the private key and updates it. That's centralization, obviously.
You can get arbitrarily complex with how smart contracts are updated. You can have multisig, where 2:3 have to vote to update, or you can have actual voting, or you can even do voting by stakeholder in the contract.
But whatever you choose, it's fully a function of the smart contract itself what level of decentralization it achieves, and not at all about Ethereum.