All these things, "genetics, neurones" etc. are chaotic systems. Thus there is only /necessarily/ probabilistic "conditions" on who you are; event at the classical level.
It's classical physics which is necessarily indeterminate here /because/ we cannot measure precisely enough.
I think this is significant enough to somehow fit it into the picture on free will. Not least, because as you say elsewhere, free will actually requires a level of determinism which may actually be absent from the world.
The meaning of the future being "open" here isnt reducible to "a roll of the die". Almost all significant macroscopic systems have a "deterministic gap" between their state today and their state tomorrow.
In some sense chaotic systems must be able to "forget their history", as at some point, their historical state sequences will be insufficient to determine their present state. There may be something in this which enables a certain sense of freedom, and a certain lack of it.
We can't predict very much about the state of a hurricane a week in advance, but my calendar at work is full of events weeks and months in advance that experience tells me have a very high likelihood of happening much as expected. Our projects are extremely complex and can take years to complete. All of that doesn't look much like a chaotic system to me.
A chaotic system, K, is one in which the probability of measuring a "high order digit" (eg., 10,000) in the output is sensitive to a "low order digit" in the input (eg., 0.000001).
Something like: P(log_o K(state) | log_i state) < 1 where o >> i
It seems true that a non-chaotic deterministic function, eg., f(t) can be created such that "K(state) is bounded by f(approximation)".
Eg., K(state) is the weather, and f(approximation) is the climate model. Or K(state) is the behaviour of gas particles, and f(approximation) is the gases temperature model. Or K(state) is the changing matter distribution of the universe, and f(approximation) is the stable gravitational field model in our solar system.
f() is long-run predictable -- but K() isnt. But we know f() fails in the long-run -- K() does eventually change against the predictions of our model f().
Eg., over long periods of time, the climate changes; the non-ideal gasses may spontaneously condense; the sun "explodes".
f() is only ever a locally/apparently deterministic approximation.
Note that I am not suggesting that this will answer your questions, or that it does so for me. I have a strong suspicion that the most it does is provide some sort of explanation for why we tend to feel we have free will (or, equivalently I think, to define it in a non-intuitive way.)
Free will is the real 'hard problem' for materialists who think they have it. Dualists will not even get to that question until they can offer some affirmative hypotheses about whatever is going on in minds.
Interesting that you'd frame it that way, because empirical studies have shown that lay people intuitively agree more with Compatibilism [1].
[1] Why Compatibilist Intuitions are not Mistaken: A Reply to Feltz and Millan, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274892120_Why_Compa...
I doubt, however, that this will be the last word on the issue. Indeed, in "Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility", Fischborn writes, about this paper,
"In fact, people might even consider that free will is compatible with fatalism, a stronger version of determinism, as long as fatalism does not preclude an agent's actions to derive from their desires and values (Andow & Cova, 2016)" - my emphasis, as that seems to be begging the question in a way.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319445158_Questions...
But, I'm perhaps not a typical Compatibilist, as I think in a meaningful sense that we are more blameworthy the more deterministic we are [1].
The word random implies a lack of order that we can't rightly claim knowledge of.
The BBP formula can be used to calculate the Nth digit of pi without computing all preceding digits. I'd say that's pretty successful compression.
> The word random implies a lack of order that we can't rightly claim knowledge of.
That we have no knowledge of it does not entail that no such knowledge exists. That's the point I'm trying to make: we have no evidence of such a distinction, we only have evidence of our ignorance of the sequence's cause. The universe could very well be completely deterministic, in which case the set of "random" sequences is empty.
Where in the physical laws of the universe would you even look for free will?
For me free will us about agency. The important thing about a decision I freely make is that I as a free agent am the cause of the decision, not external influences or random effects. That actually demands a high degree of determinism, because it means I, my state, my memories skills preferences and biases determine the outcome. Otherwise it’s not _my_ choice.
The catch 22 on that is that I don’t get to decide my state. I can’t choose my genetics, the way my neurons connected when I was a foetus, etc. We are all stuck with who we are. It’s this line of thinking that for example converted me from a retributionist to a reformist on the issue of criminal rehabilitation. I just can’t stand firm against the implacability of the logic. I have no choice.