And even if someone thinks of the problem there's usually some kind of failsafe (an override key or angle grinder) in place.
The point I think that we have to keep in mind here is that it seems that Facebook overlooked many many points of failure and was very sure of their own ability at doing everything and doing it perfectly all the time.
Anecdote from my previous life: Large corporation you would all recognize and which I won't name for obvious reasons. They ran their own data center(s) and it wasn't a side hustle to do that. One morning I come to the office and I have lots of messages about a massive outage. One of the data centers is offline. Like completely offline. I'm a bit fuzzy on some details because it's been a while but the main story went something like:
External power goes out for whatever reason (don't remember)
Batteries take over
Diesel generators start up
Batteries keep draining
Diesels are spinning
All Servers shut down
What happened to this massively redundant and well planned out data center? Nobody knew and again, fuzzy on the details but the report that came out a few days later was that somewhere in that system, was a non-redudant breaker/power line combo somewhere. And that breaker went flying for some reason.But, more seriously, nobody plans for BGP failures, BGP is a single system, with a distributed database across the internet, so there's no redundancy for it, and to add it up, it's nearly completely invisible, most people don't even know it's there.
I won't pretend to know the details of FB's infrastructure, and I'm sure there was a cascade of problems that made the outage harder to fix, but it sounds like years of separate teams building on top of other layers that were "guaranteed" to be online finally collapsed into a spectacular fireball.
It's not like there were twenty different network engineers that typed the exact same command across their network. Ultimately it was one person who typed "enter" and submitted the bad change. And the problem wasn't even necessarily the change -- mistakes should be expected. The problem was the lack of a back-out strategy in case this happened.
DNS hosted on your own registrar, within your own data center for a whole host of domains. Somehow integrating your office security so that it also depends on that same DNS and running BGP updates without an emergency "undo" plan?
I hate to over-simplify but Single point of failure is the first thing you ever learn about Business Continuity. We shouldn't need to learn these lessons from a big mistake, that's what college is for.