If your tool is capable of draining the whole universe, period, it is too dangerous to exist.
That was one of the big takeaways: global config changes must happen slowly. (Whether we've fully internalized that lesson is a different matter.)
The pure takeaway is probably that it's important to design systems where "large" operations are rarely required, and frequent ops actions are all "small."
Because otherwise, you're asking for an impossible process (quick and protected).
Some tools are well engineered, capable of the Sisyphean task of globally deploying updates but others are rapid prototypes that, sure, are too dangerous to exist, but the whole point of SREs being capable programmers is that the work has problems that are most efficiently solved with one-off code that just isn't (because it can't be) rigorously tested before being used. You can bet there was some of that used in recovering from this incident. (I'm sure there were many eyes reviewing the code before being run, but that only goes so far when you're trying to do something that you never expected, like having to revive Facebook.)
There's solutions to that, but of course these sorts of tools all come into existence well before the system reaches a size where how they work becomes dangerous.
This was an important lesson for SREs inside and outside Google because it shows the dangers of the antipattern of command line flags that narrow the scope of an operation instead of expanding it. I.e. if your command was supposed to be `drain -cell xx` to locally turn-down a small resource pool but `drain` without any arguments drains the whole universe, you have developed a tool which is too dangerous to exist.