With crappy password requirements, it's impossible to use decent passphrases. Getting locked out of your account for 3 failed attempts at typing a 30-character password is pretty obnoxious, too.
In situations that allow passphrases, you don't need a password generator like this. You can grab a sentence from your favorite book and use it. e.g. "How do you do, Miss Doolittle?" That's not the best choice, but it's still got way more entropy than a standard password, probably a lot more entropy more than you'll get by choosing a 4-gram composed of words from a corpus of 2k, and it's easier to remember.
Your favorite book is almost certainly chosen from the 129 million books that Google knows about: http://www.fastcompany.com/1678254/how-many-books-are-there-...
That gives you 27 bits of entropy.
The average book length is probably not over 400 pages. An average page probably doesn't have over 25 sentences on it. So the whole book contains only ten thousand sentences.
That gives you 14 more bits of entropy.
The total is 41 bits of entropy. This is one-eighth as secure as a 4-gram composed of random words from a corpus of 2k, if we measure strictly by entropy.
The situation is actually much worse, though: your favorite book is probably a popular book. So the number of bits of entropy provided by the choice of book might be a lot smaller than 27. I would guess that it's perhaps 10.
And many of those 129 million books are not very different. They contain quotes from other books, reprinted short stories, folk tales, set phrases, and so on.
In practice I think it might be difficult to mount a password-guessing attack using the Google Books corpus, because it's hard to get access to that corpus. The Project Gutenberg corpus would not be so hard.
If you want to mount such an attack, fine, but most of us are dealing with the much-more-common threat of someone who gets a file or a database of hashed passwords and wants to crack them all in one go.
On the plus side, a sentence is probably going to be easier to remember than 4 random words. Personally, I draw some of my "high-security" passwords from literature, but then I modify the case and do the "leetspeak" character substitution, so a naive sentence attack would not work. A more clever one might, though.
41 bits of entropy means you have on the order of a one in 10^12 chance (2^41) of guessing it, and 2,000^4 is on the order of 10^16. So how is the former "one eighth as secure" as the other? Wouldn’t it be 10^4 times less secure, that is, 10,000 times more likely to be cracked?
If you have a long password (at least 16 characters), all other requirements are waived so that you can use passphrases.
Instead of 4 extra enforcements you could add 8 extra characters.
Your entropy is (somewhat simplified)
One 8 letter word: 15 bits
1 uppercase = 3 bits (or even just 1 bit, people capitalize the first letter)
reversing 2 rules above: 1 bit
replacing two characters at random places: 8*7/2 = 4.8 bits
inserting 2 random non alphabet characters: 40^2 = 10.6 bits Total: 34.4
The entropy of three medium difficulty words is log(4000^3) = 35.9
Instead of memorizing K!ybo4rd it could be mykeyboardisblue.
Which is exactly the sort of terrible restriction xkcd is criticizing.
There's the secure piece, and there's the obeisance to the stupid website piece.
To prevent unauthorised access to your account your password must contain 8 characters.
Wait, what? They're right, too. You can't have 7 characters and you can't have 9.
It's a bruteforcer's dream.
I work on behalf of 123-reg.
We are working on changing this in future control panel updates.
Regards,
Ricky
So rather than discovering the correct way to do things, they try to prevent you from using any characters that might be involved in an SQL injection.
In some cases the guys on the backend know what they're doing, but the requirement can still be passed down from on high from some manager who absorbed the practice from another project.
Edit: If you meant the "but not %, ^, &, or *" requirement, that's an indication that the devs don't know how to use prepared statements or at least escape properly.
As an aside, 1000 guesses a second? Seems generous.
I haven't typed a password in 3+ months - don't know what any of mine are anymore, so I find typing is no longer an issue.
1) Nothing written down 2) Unique per service 3) Adjustable difficulty & char set per service, to match their stupid requirements.
Seems like the best of several worlds.
1) A lot of sites, still in this day and age, have max password lengths, so I still have a lot of short passwords. Usually this is bank sites and the like.
2) Password entry fields are often very short visually, and with a long password getting lost is much easier. I find I have to type them over A LOT.
The second is actually the more annoying problem.