> what kind of encryption can't be decrypted until some threshold has been crossed?

The kind Apple has built. You should read the docs. This is literally how it works.

This is the same company that saved the disk encryption password as the password hint. You really trust them to not screw this up when the stakes are that it could ruin your life and/or land you in jail? I'm simply not ok with that.

How exactly do you imagine a bug in this will land you in jail?

Ever heard of planted evidence?

You haven’t explained how evidence could be planted. That is what you are being asked.

No, I'm saying they designed the system so that they don't have the key to decypt the scan result "vouchers" until after the device tells them that the 30 image threshold is crossed.

>Apple is unable to process individual vouchers; instead, all the properties of our system mean that it’s only once an account has accumulated a collection of vouchers associated with illegal, known CSAM images that we are able to learn anything about the user’s account.

Now, why to do it is because, as you said, this is something that will provide that detection capability while preserving user privacy.

https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/10/interview-apples-head-of-p...

Meanwhile, a single false positive from an on server scan is open to malicious use by anyone who can get a subpeona.

The lady doth protest too much, methinks

Just going to respond to every post on here with these absurd points? K apple guy.