> make it illegal to offer E2E encryption without this backdoor.
It isn’t a back door to E2E encryption. It can’t even be used to search for a specific image on a person’s device.
It could be used possibly to find a collection of images that are not CSAM but are disliked by the state, assuming Apple is willing to enter into a conspiracy with NCMEC.
It seems that Apple does not need to be a co-conspirator, and that it would be sufficient if someone added ‘malicious’ hashes to the NCMEC database.
Not correct. When enough images to trigger a match are detected apple employees verify the visual derivative to make sure it matches before an alert is generated. They would need to collude.
You’re right, I was thinking about a breach of privacy in general instead of actual legal consequences. (Though the possibility of governments backdooring Apple’s servers to access decrypted files stands, that shouldn’t make a difference with this iCloud-Photos-only spyware)
Whether users are worse off or not entirely depends on the rate of false positives. That's the biggest issue IMO and OP's article points out how there is zero published and trustworthy information on that.
Presumably to implement E2E encryption, while at the same time helping the NCMEC to push for legislation to make it illegal to offer E2E encryption without this backdoor.
Apple users would be slightly better off than the status quo, but worse off than if Apple simply implemented real E2E without backdoors, and everyone else's privacy will be impacted by the backdoors that the NCMEC will likely push.