By comparison I have very little trust in modern IM software.
Same way I wouldn't trust a gmail/outlook/whatever-apple-named-theirs automatic mail encryption the way I can trust a bulky weird to use pgp one.
Why would they be able to? I haven't heard of any such exploits for Signal, and their crypto as well as their app-related code is open, well-documented, and repeatedly audited.
Also:
> their crypto as well as their app-related code is open, well-documented, and repeatedly audited.
And since nobody builds their executable from source, it doesn't at all guarantee anything about the version I have on my phone right now, unless I do a lot of extra check that virtually no one will do on every update. If whatever entity* aiming for me chose to target a specific update at me on the store that did a clear copy send on the side, I would never know.
* Say, China aiming for a chinese user on whatever chinese app store is popular at the moment, to take the most obvious (but clearly not only) exemple
How many people build gnupg or gpg-agent from source?
> Whatever entity
Seems like something your local apt/pacman repository mirror host could do too.
It's a fair concern. I'm not trying to be disingenuous, sorry if it comes off that way. I'm just focusing on Signal because you wrote "modern IM software".
More people than those build signal from source
> Seems like something your local apt/pacman repository mirror host could do too.
Which is why I focus on build from source, and more people fo it for pgp than any im software out there.
I am aware that "there are solutions", but are they (really) enough? Isn't "breaking in" required at some point?
Another endgame for Bitcoin is that all Bitcoin are stolen through the one tool which helps with ("unbreakable") encryption: Hacking / social engineering.
Besides that we hab substantial discussions about why PGP isn't really cutting it for use with email (to cumbersome, at one point you lose your private key, recipient struggles to decrypt, etc.).