That seems reasonably sustainable. Make it into South Korea with airstrikes.
61% by 2018. The writing was on the wall.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/08/world/asia/us...
How is that not containment if they can’t take major areas?
So, impossible if we don’t get others on board, among Arab countries in general, perhaps China or Russia too.
If that's the case, it's a recent development in the last several years. Possibly since the Ukraine incident. Russia and the Taliban have been enemies for decades before.
If Afghans want US protection that doesn’t require boots on the ground, that seems reasonable considering capabilities already available. “Peace through superior firepower.”
I particularly look forward to Russia’s declining influence as the world transitions away from oil. As much as people like to criticize US leadership and government, the Kremlin is on a whole different level (and I’m glad that this isn’t such a controversial sentiment among liberals since 2016).
Meanwhile “every country has a reason to hate US”, hating the US is often the easy game to play in local politics, and maybe all of them are joining the tipping jar to pay those who can make us decline. Loss of trust towards media and institutions, judges ruling that monopolies can keep rolling or judges “not acting” when clearly facing criminal activity, loss of trust towards police, activism groups which I’d wonder how they remain out of prison, that requires funding and bribes; if I were the Talibans, China, Russia, or any country of the middle east really, I would fund them until the US collapses or loses its dominant position. It’s all hypothesis but it’s easy to implement.
It’s not a given that USA doesn’t decline in front of other, less hated superpowers.
So it must be a popular ideology for some.
[0] https://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2009/12/09/taliban-pay-vs-...
[1] https://theconversation.com/the-taliban-are-megarich-heres-w...
[2] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46554097
[3] https://www.bbc.com/news/10302946
[4] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-security-idUS...
Also, your [4] link is specifically talking about the police being underpaid and undertrained, not the army. My guess is that it primarily comes down to a huge motivation gap. The Afghani soldiers and police are in it for a paycheck, not to get shot, while the Taliban are fighting for an ideological cause they perceive to be just.
[0] - https://foreignassistance.gov/cd/AFG?measure=Obligations&fis...
>The Afghani soldiers and police are in it for a paycheck
I think you meant, "Afghan soldiers and police." Afghani is (fittingly) the Afghan unit of currency.
>...while the Taliban are fighting for an ideological cause they perceive to be just.
It's not a matter of how many Afghans perceive a certain cause to be just. It's a matter of how many are willing to suffer and die for their cause to come out on top. Even if only a minority support the Taliban, as recent polling shows to be the case, they can impose their will on the majority if they're more willing to suffer and kill. Of course, suffering is easier to endure when you're getting paid.
This isn't exactly a compelling argument for our continued support of Afghanistan's government... We've been funding them to the tune of $3-10 billion a year in defense funding, and the corruption is so extreme that they are failing against the Taliban, with estimated total funding of $300 million to $1.6 billion [0]? That's an obscene level of graft. If 20 years on we still haven't reduced corruption to a manageable level, is it realistically even achievable?
> It's not a matter of how many Afghans perceive a certain cause to be just. It's a matter of how many are willing to suffer and die for their cause to come out on top. Even if only a minority support the Taliban, as recent polling shows to be the case, they can impose their will on the majority if they're more willing to suffer and kill. Of course, suffering is easier to endure when you're getting paid.
I saw the 13.4% statistic that you cited elsewhere, but I'm inclined to think that's either a low estimate or there are an awful lot of people who are ambivalent as long as basic government services continue. If the Taliban were truly culturally incompatible with the average citizen, surely there would be more organized resistance? From the news reports I've seen, the Taliban typically move into a new area, the local government rolls over, basic services continue, and the average person shrugs and moves on with their life.
You don't get a renewed 10 billion dollars in defense grants by showing well maintained equipment and a well disciplined army.
I haven't made such an argument. Just outlining the problems.
Edit: Also, I recall hearing that many fighters are foreign. I imagine there's a greater than zero amount of people willing to go to Afghanistan and fight the US.
To be clear, they aren’t fighting the US, they’re fighting the Afghani government.
You can say this about any abhorrent, oppressive belief system. This is insufficient grounds to subject the whole population to said oppression.
> So it must be a popular ideology for some.
hHow do you get from there to “thus it should be the law of the land for every Afghan”? If it’s so popular, why can’t it win in free elections?
> Overall, confidence in governmental and nongovernmental organizations has increased, with the exception of the Independent Election Commission, which has seen confidence drop from 43.3% in 2018 to 42.3% in 2019. As in previous years, Afghans have the most confidence in religious leaders (71.2%). Compared to 2018, confidence in MPs has gone up by 10.2 percentage points, from 42.3% in 2018 to 52.6% in 2019, the highest level so far. Confidence in the following organizations has improved since last year: government ministers (up 6.1 percentage points, to 44.4%), national NGOs (up 4.0 percentage points, to 53.3%), provincial councils (up 4.7 percentage points, to 55.6%) and international NGOs (up 4.9 percentage points, to 47.3%)
So religious leaders (presumably non-Taliban) have much stronger support than the government or NGOs.
"The Asia Foundation (TAF), a Central Intelligence Agency proprietary, was established in 1954 to undertake cultural and educational activities on behalf of the United States Government in ways not open to official U.S. agencies."[17]
The Asia Foundation is an outgrowth of the Committee for a Free Asia, which was founded by the U.S. government in 1951.[18] CIA funding and support of the Committee for a Free Asia and the Asia Foundation were assigned the CIA code name "Project DTPILLAR".[19]
In 1954, the Committee for a Free Asia was renamed the Asia Foundation (TAF) and incorporated in California[20] as a private, nominally non-governmental organization devoted to promoting democracy, rule of law, and market-based development in post-war Asia.
In the 1950s, the Asia Foundation “clandestinely supported anti-Communist motion picture industry personnel, ranging from producers, directors, and technicians to critics, writers, and general intellectuals in many parts of Asia.”[21]
Among the original founding officers of the board, there were several presidents/chairmen of large companies including T.S. Peterson, CEO of Standard Oil of California (now Chevron), Brayton Wilbur, president of Wilbur-Ellis Co., and J.D. Zellerbach, chairman of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation; four university presidents including Grayson Kirk from Columbia, J.E. Wallace Sterling of Stanford, and Raymond Allen from UCLA; prominent attorneys including Turner McBaine and A. Crawford Greene; Pulitzer Prize-winning writer James Michener; Paul Hoffman, the first administrator of the Marshall Plan in Europe; and several major figures in foreign affairs.
In 1966, Ramparts revealed that the CIA was covertly funding a number of organizations, including the Asia Foundation.[17] A commission authorized by President Johnson and led by Secretary of State Rusk determined that the Asia Foundation should be preserved and overtly funded by the US government. Following this change, The Asia Foundation was classified as a private, nonprofit, nongovernmental organization under the section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.[22] The Foundation began to restructure its programming, shifting away from its earlier goals of "building democratic institutions and encouraging the development of democratic leadership" toward an emphasis on Asian development as a whole (CRS 1983).”