Then perhaps you could explain it? I also don't understand why server-side versus client-side CSAM inspection makes a big difference.

If I ask you to store my images, and you therefore have access to the images, you can scan them for stuff using your computers. The scope is limited to the images I ask you to store, and your computers are doing what you ask them to.

If you reprogram my computer to scan my images stored on my computer… different thing entirely. I don't have a problem with checking them for child abuse (in fact, I'd give up quite a bit of freedom to stop that), but nothing about this tech makes it specific to child abuse. I don't want my computer ratting me out for stuff that I have the right (or, possibly, the obligation) to be doing, just because the powerful don't want me doing it. At the moment, it doesn't.

This tech makes Apple-controlled computers untrustworthy. It will probably lead to the deaths of political dissidents; these things always do. Is that worth it?

So far, this is only for iCloud photos so currently it seems highly similar to what we have now except that it’s on the device and could be done with end to end encryption, unlike the current approach.

For me, the big concern is how it could be expanded. This is a real and valid problem but it’s certainly not hard to imagine a government insisting it needs to be expanded to cover all photos, even for people not using iCloud, and we’d like you to add these signatures from some images we can’t show you. Once the infrastructure is there it’s a lot easier to do that.

Yes. If Apple takes the “we're not going to” stance, then this could be okay… but they've been doing that less and less, and they only ever really did that in the US / Australia. Apple just isn't trustworthy enough.

Also that since the system is opaque by design it’d be really hard to tell if details changes. Technically I understand why that’s the case but it makes the question of trust really hard.