The point is that in an "effective default", there's no violation of any explicit contract however much the loaning parties may have lost confidence. IE, if Greece was home-owner renegotiating its mortgage, there is no point where the bank can go to court and demand the house (though against sovereign nation, banks, of course, have no such recourse but its considered important, I believe).
Another agency, the ISDA, says it's _not_ a default for the purposes of a CDS trigger. That, for another percentage of the population, is binary-off. http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/07/22/the-cds-mar...
A way to describe what is happens is that the EU says "we know some people are worried about the money Greece owns them. For them, we offer insurance. We have several pricing schemes for that assurance:..."
Phrasing it that way would IMO put some spin on it, but it would not be a bland lie, either.
I think they stroke a good balance here. It is not arm-wrestling, but they likely will reach the intended goals (decrease immediate pressure on Greece, and show the world that the EU will help countries in trouble)
I promise to pay you $100 tomorrow. I then tell you you'll get your money in 30 years and at a much lower interest rate. That's breaking the original promise, even though I haven't actually 'not paid you back'.