TPM isn't active on many private devices, so the ability to abuse its capability was more or less impossible. That would come after it is firmly established.

What we do know thought is the software landscape of devices that are indeed locked down mostly to the benefit of the manufacturers. Turns out the uniformity of that software landscape didn't stop NSO from silently taking over phones. Different threat scenario, but I think the pattern is clear.

I think we need a closer examination on how often private devices are affected by firmware attacks or messing with boot. As far as I know they have become quite rare. Perhaps I need to shift my paranoia there, but I am not convinced.

But these questions are irrelevant if TPM stays optional. A lot of IT security comes down to trust problems, so I fail to see why possible disadvantages shouldn't be examined.

As far as I know I could activate TPM right now, so I also fail to see how "folks" hold practical security back. Weighting security mechanisms is also an essential step. I am just not convinced it does improve my practical security, while maybe it proves detrimental to general computing.

Normally full disk encryption and booting security is the province of your OS. To my recollection both Bitlocker and LUKS can optionally use the TPM which means it can be used for 100% of the use cases which would improve computer security.

What are we missing out on exactly?

> even though they have been put in PCs for 15 years now.

i have never seen a consumer motherboard with a TPM device in the last 15 years. In fact, the last batch of enthusiast AM4 ones ("pro" model), the TPM doesn't even have the Header populated, only the holes for one that you can solder a header.

And non-workstation office machines from hp and dell ship weird ones that probably won't even pass the win11 test.

TPM is typically implemented in firmware for consumer boards. Having the option to upgrade to a hardware TPM module is nice, but probably not necessary for the vast majority of users. Hardware TPMs also come with their own sustainability questions regarding bugs/upgrades and how/if that process works. This is hard to do without compromising the benefits of using a physically separate TPM unless the end-user takes some form of responsibility in the custodianship themselves (which is not likely at the consumer level).

Considering that the vast majority of boards aren't going to need the header, the board manufacturers can scale cost reduced versions for the masses and spin versions with a couple more headers for a couple more dollars for the fringe users that want them (pre-)populated. Seems like a rational business decision?

Why is that? It is because the TPM failed in the consumer market. Why is that?

One reason is the constant stream of FUD from the anti-DRM folks.

> FUD

https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html

You think all those FIDO members don't care about DRM. That is beyond naive in my opinion. Security is a trust problem, so much should be clear before even starting to discuss it.

Also FUD is employed by presenting advantages of TPM as it often invokes ransomware.

Nice, but probably 99% of ransomware is just executed in user space and starts encrypting typical network drives in typical corporations. Some are more sophisticated, but I haven't seen any bios attacks recently. And why would they? Ransomware is quite profitable.

> the constant stream of FUD from the anti-DRM folks.

Yes? Fear, uncertainty and doubt is the correct attitude toward TPMs. (Assuming you count "We know it's going to hurt us, just not how long it will take to happen." as "doubt".)