I'd much rather _not_ have my desktop "limp along" in a poorly understood and probably exploitable fashion while the malware gets a chance to finish encrypting all my files...
If that costs the world the "benefit" of my shared wisdom in a half written Hackernews post, I'm good with that.
I call these the "already lost" situations. You've already lost, we're just arguing about how to distribute the lossage. While those discussions aren't completely pointless, it is important to keep it clear in our head we're arguing about how to pick up the bodies at a crash site and not how to prevent the crash in the first place; it's a different mindset.
Despite some moderately-justified mockery in the other messages in this thread, the answer really is "just don't crash and have secure code here", which is to say, "don't lose". It's exceeding hard to write and it's a very high bar, but at the same time, it's very difficult to imagine how to secure a single system when you can't even stipulate a core of trusted software exists. If you don't even have a foundation, you're not going to build a secure structure. In this case, by "secure" I don't just mean security, but also, functionality and everything else.
It depends really what your server does, and what the consequences of it doing the wrong thing are.
Fire an alert, remove that server from the load balancer, and fix the problem without your customers even noticing.
Or make sure if you're running a hobby-project architected platform that your customer expectations and SLAs are clear up front, and let it go down until Monday morning when you'll get around to fixing it.
Keeping it small and simple to minimize bugs is perfectly viable and reasonable.
In a server I generally want a crash immediately. But on a desktop I'd rather it limp along and give me a chance to finish writing my Hackernews post.