Re:Ghidra: A software reverse engineering suite of tools dev...
by IncRnd on Wednesday July 14, 2021 @07:49AM
(#27832040)
It's best not to assume a physical presence is required. Who is to say that the people at Let's Encrypt, NoScript, any of the firmwares' authors, or many other places weren't compromised years ago? It's sometimes worthwhile to reflect on where trust is placed.
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Re:Ghidra: A software reverse engineering suite of tools dev...
by atonse on Wednesday July 14, 2021 @08:10AM
(#27832179)
I don’t know. Seeing how extensively these key signing ceremonies (Let’s Encrypt included) are designed against tampering and collusion, I’d be shocked and impressed if they were infiltrated.
We’ve found instead that the NSA can just take over your unpatched computer easily instead of putting in the effort of hacking Let’s Encrypt.
Re:Ghidra: A software reverse engineering suite of tools dev...
by IncRnd on Wednesday July 14, 2021 @08:39AM
(#27832376)
Unfortunately, a child can take over an unpatched computer using public exploits.
Please explain your comment about how key signing ceremonies stop people from being bribed. The creation of those keys creates a root of trust but doesn't stop leaf certs from being generated.
Re:Ghidra: A software reverse engineering suite of tools dev...
by atonse on Friday July 16, 2021 @06:09PM
(#27861795)
Sure it doesn’t stop certs for certain domains but again it feels handwavy to say someone can just as easily do these things. Theoretically yeah. But to be a publicly trusted CA, the kind of processes you need to have a pretty extensive.
Still, there are hundreds of publicly trusted CAs so the chance for exploitation is higher.
Re:Ghidra: A software reverse engineering suite of tools dev...
by nextlevelwizard on Wednesday July 14, 2021 @09:14AM
(#27832635)
It would be hell of a trick to inflitrate air gapped machine without physical presence.