Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentication

Re:Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentic... by csunbird on Wednesday July 07, 2021 @11:44AM (#27762371)

It is easier for US to ask Apple to monitor the traffic for a specific user, if the exit node is in US soil. Although the sibling comments say that it is probably a bug, and I hope that it actually is.

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Re:Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentic... by djrogers on Wednesday July 07, 2021 @01:03PM (#27763354)

Thanks to the design of Private Relay, apple can’t monitor a specific user’s traffic.

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Re:Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentic... by ffo on Wednesday July 07, 2021 @01:22PM (#27763552)

From a design perspective you are right.

But from a threat model I would dare to say, if you control the platform (OS, Cloud Service) you can easy bypass encryption or deploy your own keys as well.

In the end it is still a trust question.

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Re:Apple's “iCloud Private Relay” broke risk based authentic... by Forbo on Wednesday July 07, 2021 @03:31PM (#27764909)

Until I see a subpoena that fails to yield any user information, I'll continue to be doubtful as to their claims.

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