The IdM box in the provided diagram [1] is the same single point of failure "policy engine" and "ID management" architecture that is advocated by the "zero trust" crowd [2]. It's the same type of flawed centralised architecture that allowed the Solarwinds Orion exploit to be used to such great effect [3]. At least the ZTA paper calls out this weakness [4], but unless I missed something the paper severely understates the risk that a central "policy engine" presents, and glosses over all the other components ("threat intelligence feeds", host-based agents, etc) which are centralised in this architecture and present a similar risk.

[1] https://imgur.com/Hcwayqq

[2] NIST SP 800-207, Figure 2, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.S...

[3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_United_States_federal_gov...

[4] NIST SP 800-207, Section 5.1, https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.S...