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Re:DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop by Shenglong on Monday July 11, 2011 @12:46PM (#2751449)
Prosecutors stressed that they don't actually require the passphrase itself, meaning Fricosu would be permitted to type it in and unlock the files without anyone looking over her shoulder.

I wonder if anyone has thought of using more than one keys as a decryption possibility. I've always considered it, but never figured there'd be too much use. Say, have one correct key to decrypts data stored in one way, and another key to either "decrypts" into a pre-generated text, or another variation of what's stored. I guess it latter might be too content dependent.

Re:DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop by jarin on Monday July 11, 2011 @12:50PM (#2751473)
Truecrypt has supported that kind of plausible deniability for a while.
Re:DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop by themenace on Monday July 11, 2011 @07:55PM (#2752969)
And there is a system called Deniable Video extends that concept of plausible deniability to live audio & video. It's like TrueCrypt for real-time data.
Re:DOJ: We can force you to decrypt that laptop by a3_nm on Monday July 11, 2011 @01:33PM (#2751644)
Systems like PhoneBookFS, rubberhose and StegFS exist (or used to exist). They allow you to create volumes which can provide different data for different passwords, with no way to know the number of available passwords in advance. (You can look at the volume size, but there is some variability relative to the total amount of data stored, so that you can't really be sure.)

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption.