So SIP's don't change any of that except maybe the possibility of formal verification and easier patching of discovered flaws.

You get similar guarantees to hardware checks with less overhead thats the point.

Either way you're going to want to pay bounties for bugs hardware or software. Security work is never done.

JAAS and CAS where not SIP, I am not sure why you keep trying to conflate them.

Because Singularity is hardly any different from something like SavaJe OS, in what concerns use of type safe programming language as security boundary.

It was abandoned in 2006 and SIP were never validated in production under real attacks.

Even Midori had more real use, having powered Asian Bing subnet for a while.

To worship it in 2021 is just theory without pratical results.

I have concerns about hardware as a security boundary as well, more so lately, as should you I hope and it's much more difficult to patch hardware.

Again Midori used SIP's so it was validated in production, right?

Projecting worship on to me is not productive, no need to be childish about this. All the points you bring up for software isolation exist with hardware isolation, formal verification could help both and there is a lot of work in that area.

I think software needs to become safe by default, the endless buffer overflows need to stop. If you then take the stance user land software must be written in a safe language then the need for hardware isolation might not need to exist in it's current form and thats very interesting to me, thats all.

You are ignoring the remaining 30% of security exploits that safe languages don't protect you from, including SIP.

Which are what? How does hardware isolation protect against them?