Risk assessment and threat modeling are huge for creating such a prioritization. Whether it’s formal and in depth or informal depends again on where things are.
Beyond these concepts, well engineered software simply has less security defects, so focusing on quality and managing technical debt often means less security debt as well.
It’s down to being an immature practitioner to think security concerns are always the primary ones. I think it’s a hard skill to master though, so I am not saying that with great judgement, someone should be a champion for security at most organizations and advocate for it. I think using empathy and curiosity goes a long way to maturing as a practitioner, but it took me many years of practice.
I think one of the best things we can do as security professionals is to identify or work to create security measures that have outsized ROI and advocate for those. Using battle-tested software is one, as are, I believe, measures like MFA.
There are three things that most security types don’t understand:
1. Security is a small component of risk. Impact (in dollars) x Likelihood = Risk
2. Cybersecurity insurance can change the risk equation dramatically
3. It is possible for a security remediation to kill/harm more people than the underlying insecure system that the fix is being applied to
Once you realize that security is a risk problem then you’re able to quantify that problem in dollars. Lives affected can be used as a metric too but dollars are the magical language that everyone can understand.
Two things:
1. Security to some extent doesn't always need to impede engineering. Enterprise IT security is very much focused on removing risky behaviour, without providing any alternatives.
2. The cost to the business losing IP it cannot generate due to excessive security practices should be taken into account when doing these exercises.
I'd argue that the security part of this organization has gone "rogue" and is solely focused on justifying its own existence. It's as if the security part is more focused on reducing liability for itself than it is on actually securing systems.
That said, I still think that most organizations put too little emphasis on security, not too much. And oftentimes, too late.
EDIT: an analogy I like to use is that oftentimes these people try to build a castle surrounded by massive walls without doors or gates, but since people inside still have to get things from the outside they just dig a tunnel circumventing the whole thing. But since it wasn't approved there is no liability problem for the security part of the org.
I also recognise that "when a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure", and cash as the bottom line risks increasing this tendency.
Too idealistic, probably :)
1. It clarifies your thinking around impact. The simple exercise of sitting down and trying to put a dollar amount on the reputation damage your organization would suffer if Bad Thing were to happen will help you better understand the likelihood and potential consequences of Bad Thing.
2. It allows for more easy comparison to the costs that will be incurred while mitigating the risk. If you think the impact of Bad Thing will be "significant reputation damage", that's bad, but it doesn't help you decide how much time, effort, and money you ought to dedicate to preventing Bad Thing.
Blindly chasing metrics can lead to pathological behaviour, for sure, so you need to balance that with strong cultural values, but overall I would say the security industry is terribly heavy on cultural values right now and pays little to no attention to measuring what actually matters to organizations.
And when you accept this fact, you can skip lamenting about all sorts of ethical questions and just know that everything will be a monetary decision in the end.
An immature one, of the sort many companies have, may have difficulty with some or all of these steps. Often the immaturity is invisible until it's too late - an impact or likelihood is far higher than estimated (and thus your quantification was wildly off and you took your estimate too seriously), there's no organizational accountability (so nobody who makes serious mistakes has to learn from it), and so on.
I don't know how many SaaS startups have mature risk management processes, but I know I've seen companies well beyond the startup stage that suffer from immature ones.
Do they check if you implement best practices in security? I could imagine, that this will have an impact on the premium.
Regulation in software "does not exist" as the actual threat is minimal. If your program crashes then nobody dies ('m not talking about rockets). Therefore it always looks like security people always have temper tantrums as there is no meaningful quantifiable risk.
In our org we ended up asking pentesters to get into the systems instead of just giving us an automatically generated report that contains links to CVEs. If they cannot use existing risks to get into the system then that risk is trivial.
In an ideal world, every company would have dedicated resource for this and a well targeted/justified programme of work, but I think there's quite a few where responsibility falls on the CTO and there lists like this can be useful.
- Prioritize items on this list relative to each other.
- Prioritize items on this list relative to other work.
- Communicate the reasons for that prioritization to other members of leadership, at least.
IMO a security program which cannot justify its own worth to others in the organization is incomplete.
Most security professionals I've met (and I've been one of them, too) assume that security is or should be everyone's top priority. They struggle to deal with people for whom security is just one of many competing concerns.