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Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by tptacek on Saturday June 05, 2021 @01:50PM (#27407143)
Am I misreading this, or is this the Signal version of the bug bounty classic "user impersonation vulnerability: if I steal this session token, I can impersonate the user who it belongs to"?
Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by LurkersWillLurk on Saturday June 05, 2021 @01:57PM (#27407200)
No, you're absolutely right. The author complains that with physical possession of the device that it's possible to transfer Signal's private key material to a new device, leaving the old safety number intact.

The author apparently expects the safety number to change in order to alert the person on the other end that there "might be a hostage situation," evidently not realizing that the attacker could just, well, use the unlocked phone right in front of them.

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by pennyintheslot on Saturday June 05, 2021 @02:10PM (#27407305)
Well, if I assume that I just got temporary access to someone’s unlocked device, then it would probably be a lot more convenient for me to quickly transfer the account to one of my own devices and then access it from there instead of accessing it from my targets device which I might lose access to any moment.

So from that point of view it would be legitimate to argue that I might want to get notified if one of my contacts transfers his account. I can then double check : “Did you just transfer your signal account to a new device or was that an attacker?”

That might only be interesting for high-risk users though and could impair the UX. Why not make it optional?

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by UncleMeat on Saturday June 05, 2021 @02:44PM (#27407555)
Configurable security posture is the sort of thing that got RSA into trouble. For the huge majority of users, opinionated security is a much better approach, even ignoring the maintenance problems of having special features.

The temporary access threat model is a common criticism that people use, but it is largely incoherent. Once you are making human judgements like "enough time to transfer a signal account but not enough time to install a rootkit" things quickly break down into meaninglessness.

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by mindslight on Saturday June 05, 2021 @03:24PM (#27407828)
I don't really like trusted computing, but it is part of the mobile security model. There's a distinction between Signal deliberately facilitating extraction of the keys, and having to break a device's security to do so.
Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by goodpoint on Saturday June 05, 2021 @02:40PM (#27407528)
No, the author is right.

There are many cases where an attacker can access a device for a short time and/or without the owner realizing that the phone was tampered with.

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by staticassertion on Saturday June 05, 2021 @02:46PM (#27407565)
Just because that's possible doesn't mean that it's within Signal's threat model.
Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by contravariant on Saturday June 05, 2021 @10:03PM (#27410085)
Sure, but exactly how would you build something that's robust against that kind of access?

If you leave cryptographic keys lying around unprotected they should be assumed to be compromised.

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by klyrs on Sunday June 06, 2021 @01:12PM (#27414570)
Signal has a PIN, too. If that's required for the transfer, then it would prevent this in the case of brief, surreptitious access. A hostage scenario is impossible
Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by contravariant on Monday June 07, 2021 @04:51AM (#27420429)
Well, maybe, but 'brief' is doing a lot of the heavy lifting in that sentence.
Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by klyrs on Monday June 07, 2021 @01:20PM (#27425234)
> There are many cases where an attacker can access a device for a short time and/or without the owner realizing that the phone was tampered with.

This is what you originally responded to. I paraphrased it. The "heavy lifting" meme that you've employed is rarely more than a shallow dismissal. Be better.

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by jimio on Saturday June 05, 2021 @03:01PM (#27407679)
no session tokens involved here; we talk about the crypto behind device-to-device transfer in this blog post (https://signal.org/blog/ios-device-transfer/)

and the concepts and UX research surrounding Safety Numbers (what they are, how they're represented, and how we found they bring the most utility to the platform) in these 2016 & 2017 blog posts:

https://signal.org/blog/safety-number-updates/ https://signal.org/blog/verified-safety-number-updates/

Re:Valid Signal privacy issues shrugged off while patches qu... by StavrosK on Sunday June 06, 2021 @04:08AM (#27411581)
Yes, but it's the same general idea of obtaining private keys. I agree that this isn't much of a vulnerability.