I think this is probably a sensible default for many people engaging in casual conversations.
However, this notification should probably be configurable. That way you can be notified when communicating with high risk individuals.
The thing this proposed change would protect against is, if an attacker gets access to a participant's unlocked phone, and then transfers their Signal account, it will notify the other participants.
But an attacker can just as easily retain access to the original phone and send and receive messages with it - either physically, or by installing malware (a RAT or something) and remotely accessing the phone.
And when you move devices, because of the way the Signal ratchet works (I think), the original device doesn't get access to send or receive messages. So a device move is detectable if the original phone is returned.
It is like copying your PGP private keys from one device to another. The associated public keys are still in your correspondents key stores, certified or not. Nothing changes for them and there is no reason for them to know what you have done.
There is nothing here for Signal to do. Their issue is is the one that everyone who creates an encrypted E2EE messenger faces. There is no good analogy for cryptographic identities. So it is hard to produce a good conceptual model that the user can use to understand what they should expect and how they should react.
Third false alarm in college - no one left dorm.
Third false alarm working overseas (required we wake up etc) everyone turned off buzzers.
This doesn't appear to be anything of the kind. Signal has implemented a migration system so that people can move to a new phone without changing the safety number.
Then a bunch of references to the promises Signal makes about re-verifying if the safety number changes. Since the safety number doesn't change, none of those actually apply.