Even though this is around 140 times more representative then the USA, and the party distribution is a lot more reflective of the popular vote then in the USA (or the UK for that matter), people are still complaining that it is not good enough. There is a huge popular support for uniting the constituencies into just a single national constituency. E.g. people don’t see the point in having the local representatives on the national assembly. And I agree with it.
That said, if the people in the USA disagree with this (or think it is not applicable in the USA) and demand a local representative. The 700,000 residents per representative is kind of ridiculous. It is so low that it begs some questions about what we consider a true democracy. Even China (a country most people don’t consider democratic) has around 500,000 residents per representative in their national assembly (40% more representative then the USA).
"Tiered" voting, where we add up local majorities, is known as the tribe system in mathematical social choice theory and can be proven to be the worst possible in terms of making the individual vote matter.
If out of 5000 voters, 4985 voters prefer Alice to anybody else, 10 prefer Bob and only 5 prefer Charlie; Arrow does not mean Bob and Charlie can tell their voters "See, nobody knows who really won". Alice won. Overwhelmingly the voters prefer Alice. Arrow has nothing interesting to tell us about this scenario.
But if only 2400 prefer Alice, 1800 prefer Bob and 800 prefer Charlie, it gets trickier and Arrow starts to appear on the horizon. After all, what if every one of those Charlie supporters hates Alice and would rather have voted for Bob than see Alice win? We can try to improve our system to try to ensure we get this case right, but Arrow proves that we can't ever do a good enough job for every such case.
Especially in the case of US election it's worth remembering that if you only have two candidates, Arrow doesn't actually apply at all. A straight-forward majority works fine if all you wanted to do was decide whether the Red or Blue team wins.
Arrow's Theorem doesn't care about "tactical voting", it's about the Impossibility of what appear to be intuitively reasonable fairness constraints on the outcome. Specifically you cannot have: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives
Gibbard–Satterthwaite says if there are at least three candidates, then either one of them can't win, or some of the electorate should offer an insincere preference (ie tactical voting) to best achieve their goal.
They're closely related, if you have proved Arrow then you can get to Gibbard–Satterthwaite from there, but they are not the same exact thing.
I live in a country using another method, and in each election a lot of people begs for a change in the aggregation system. Some even say that the U.S. system is the best solution, while you are defending basically our election system.