Re:The Gerrymandering game that puts the fun in undermining ...
by thomasahle on Monday May 31, 2021 @09:40AM
(#27343944)
Say you get rid of "independence of irrelevant alternatives", then I may influence the result by tactically ordering my candidates.
Arrow's Theorem doesn't care about "tactical voting", it's about the Impossibility of what appear to be intuitively reasonable fairness constraints on the outcome. Specifically you cannot have: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives
Gibbard–Satterthwaite says if there are at least three candidates, then either one of them can't win, or some of the electorate should offer an insincere preference (ie tactical voting) to best achieve their goal.
They're closely related, if you have proved Arrow then you can get to Gibbard–Satterthwaite from there, but they are not the same exact thing.