You're arguing for the "smart network" approach. This approach already failed. Some HN readers might not even have been born when that happened. The dumb network won. Perhaps the smart network can be pulled off successfully, but it won't be by humans, and I don't see anybody else around here trying.

The supposed "chilling effects" don't work out in practice. You will sometimes see people saying oh, China blocks TLS 1.3. Nope, many of the services you use now have TLS 1.3 and yet still work fine in China. "They just push people to a fallback". Nope, Downgrade Protection means that's exactly the same as just dropping all TLS connections.

TLS 1.3 doesn't change the correct way to interpose, it just makes yet more of the bad ideas that shouldn't work actually not work. If you were doing any of those and they broke, that's not TLS 1.3, that's because you were doing something that we already warned you shouldn't work. Stop doing things that can't work.

And it's true, such people keep demanding "transparency". I think they'd probably avoid some of their problems by just admitting that what they want is at best eavesdropping and that this isn't what other people think "transparency" means. There was a whole thread about this on the TLS working group list earlier in May. We get it, you would like to eavesdrop on people, but you don't like to admit this and you'd prefer if there was some way to pretend everything is fine, while, on the other hand, actually eavesdropping.

What's funniest is that the big players in this game want to play both sides so badly they can't even stop contradicting themselves long enough to write a document. The last version of draft-camwinget-opsec-ns-impact that I reviewed has such an obvious contradiction which I called out, it wants everybody else to use RSA key exchange, so that it can snoop all their TLS traffic, but of course implementers of the draft must forbid RSA key exchange, so that nobody snoops them.