News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by daeken on Thursday June 30, 2011 @07:36PM (#2716203)
The part that bothers me about that is "triple salted hashing". This could mean any number of things, all of which point to a misunderstanding of what a salt is for.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by Joakal on Thursday June 30, 2011 @07:41PM (#2716222)
Triple salted hashing sounds like either there's three salts in a hash or it's hashed with a salt three times.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by Xk on Thursday June 30, 2011 @08:09PM (#2716303)
That is indeed what it sounds like, but what's really worrisome about that is that anyone who thinks the solution to keeping passwords is to triple-salt them really needs to learn some things about keeping passwords safe.

I could quintuple-salt my passwords with 4096 byte salts chosen purely randomly and there would be no perceivable advantage over a single 512 bit salt.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by seanalltogether on Thursday June 30, 2011 @08:07PM (#2716293)
Perhaps they mean it's salted by 3 different environments, so an attacker would need to crack the db server and 3 other servers just to get a chance to start cracking the passwords.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by daeken on Thursday June 30, 2011 @08:08PM (#2716297)
That would mean that logins would have to go through 3 different servers. If anything, I would be more worried about security in that case.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by gojomo on Thursday June 30, 2011 @09:02PM (#2716497)
Not necessarily. Let's say the salt is a combination of a per-user salt in the database, a per-user salt from a file on disk, and a per-system salt that's entered at the console at startup and held in memory.

A DB compromise doesn't reveal the other 2 salts. A full filesystem image doesn't reveal the third salt. Even an interactive root compromise would need to know to take an image of the running system's memory to get the third salt.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by uxp on Thursday June 30, 2011 @09:40PM (#2716619)
Why reinvent the wheel using engineering techniques you only have cursory knowledge of from reading an encyclopedia?

There is a standard method of securing online accounts, using known methods that are currently known to be perfectly safe in every application from financial institutions to the latest social networking site. Triple-salting passwords is not that method.

http://codahale.com/how-to-safely-store-a-password/

http://chargen.matasano.com/chargen/2007/9/7/enough-with-the...

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by gojomo on Thursday June 30, 2011 @10:40PM (#2716766)
I wasn't advocating this method or defending Mt. Gox. (Their touting of SHA-512 and use of the unclear term 'triple salted' raises red flags.)

I was providing an example of what could be meant by 'triple salting' that didn't necessarily involve 'three servers'. We could contrive scenarios where bcrypt with this multisource-salt would be a win over bcrypt with a single same-database salt. Intellectually exploring the problem and solution space requires more than just slavishly repeating the already widely-known 'standard methods'.

Have we worked together at a level that would help you assess my level of knowledge, and the sources thereof? I don't recognize your name/handle.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by uxp on Friday July 01, 2011 @12:04PM (#2718860)
No, we haven't worked together. My "cursory knowledge" comment was more directed at the people running MTGox, not you. Sorry if I phrased it in such a way to imply so.

I agree, there could be an implementation where applying multiple salts might have a benefit, but SHA-512 is not that implementation. I was not slavishly repeating 'standard methods', but pointing out that they are or were widely wrong in whatever they were doing to begin with. An MD5 is hilariously weak for password hashing, and salting an MD5 only makes an extremely weak password hashing scheme moderately weak. It honestly sounds like they took the first hashing implementation with the largest number tacked on the back of it that came to mind and called it good. This is not the right thing to do, and anyone that 1) cares about the security of their online web app's users information, and 2) has spent more than 2 minutes reading about the correct ways to secure an online web app, should be able to figure this out.

Point being, the fact that they originally only had MD5, and then "upgraded" to a salted MD5, and now are going to a triple-salted (whatever that means) SHA-512, is a BIG clue that they really don't know what they are doing, and a complex homebrew triple salt implementation that passes a password to 3 different places to be salted is bound to be broken. Unless they have hired a well known experienced cryptographer, I wouldn't trust MTGox with a dime of my internet money.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by gojomo on Friday July 01, 2011 @06:59PM (#2720485)
We agree on Mt. Gox's hand-waving, and also that intent in threads can get confused. I appreciate the apology.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by Jach on Thursday June 30, 2011 @09:26PM (#2716572)
That's very clever. Though I doubt this is what Mt. Gox is actually doing...
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by owenmarshall on Friday July 01, 2011 @09:31AM (#2718230)
That idea is absolutely not clever. It's a system that would be difficult to implement, fragile, and most importantly would provide almost no added security.

Programmers: shut the fuck up and use a well known password derivation function. Stop the NIH wanking -- homebrew cryptography is about as useful as seeing the local witch doctor for a heart attack.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by daeken on Friday July 01, 2011 @08:37AM (#2718018)
There are plenty of ways that you could use 3 different salts without it having to pass through 3 servers, but I was specifically responding to the OP, where he spoke of 3 salts in 3 different servers.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by gojomo on Friday July 01, 2011 @02:09PM (#2719455)
Yes, I should have addressed my example more specifically to the seanalltogether parent comment's assumptions.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by wiredfool on Thursday June 30, 2011 @08:13PM (#2716320)
Triple salt sounds bad. Should be Salt, Pepper, and Cayenne.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by rheide on Thursday June 30, 2011 @07:50PM (#2716260)
How so? Seems to me like it could mean any number of things, all of which succeed in securely hashing+salting a password.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by daeken on Thursday June 30, 2011 @08:10PM (#2716308)
They could be using 3 different salts, each of which is statically stored on the server. They could be using 3 per-password salts, and applying each of them once. They could be....

At the end of the day, salts are there for one thing alone: eliminating the possibility of rainbow tables. But whether you use 1 salt of decent size (64-bit minimum for that) or 1000, you've got the exact same protection there. There's a good reason it's recommended that you use PBKDF2 or bcrypt.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by eric-hu on Friday July 01, 2011 @01:46AM (#2717188)
Doesn't a salt just make a rainbow table attack more expensive, in direct relation to the length of the salt?
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by yaakov34 on Friday July 01, 2011 @03:47AM (#2717430)
No, it doesn't. Once the salt is large enough that you don't have several passwords hashed with the same salt value, there is absolutely no further advantage. Frankly, 64 bits of salt seems like enough for anything. Triple-salting sounds like a technique made up by an amateur who doesn't understand what salting is supposed to do.
Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by by on Friday July 01, 2011 @07:12AM (#2717818)
"The length of the randomly generated salt shall be at least 128 bits."

nist-sp800-132.pdf http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

Not quite the same application, but it would seem best to take a conservative approach and make your salts 128 bits because the storage required is so small - you are only storing one per username.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by yaakov34 on Friday July 01, 2011 @01:01PM (#2719130)
Right, but this doesn't make the search space 2^64 times larger, or anything of the sort. Once you've assigned a unique salt to every password, you're not getting any further benefits from salting. This is what the Mt. Gox owner doesn't seem to get, with his "triple-salting".

The NIST application involves generating keys from passwords, which you might do a gigantic number of times for every password to get unique sessions and so on. They're not talking about password storage. And even then, 128 bits seems like a huge overkill, which was included just because it's cheap, so why not. I don't mind 128-bit salts, but let's not promote that as some "ultra-secure" feature, which it isn't.

Re:Those 500K Bitcoins that caused the flash crash weren't real by tzs on Friday July 01, 2011 @01:50AM (#2717195)
Security is hard, and we KNOW they are not experts in this area. The ONLY way they can do a secure system is to use someone else's design.

Thus, the fact that they are describing it in terms that none of us have heard of is a troubling sign.