You raise the bigger point. Is there no way for their platform sandbox to handle the concerns? That is a great question.
>Plus, it’s not like normal code doesn’t have buffer overflows or other security issues.
I think normal code on an M1 only runs in rx memory blocks [0,1], so no buffer overflow attacks. At least not without another attack to remap the blocks. This might go back to A12 processors. M1 strengthened the model.
Perhaps with these newer processors, the hardware support can harden the sandbox enough to allow more flexibility. One can hope...
[0] https://blog.svenpeter.dev/posts/m1_sprr_gxf/ [1] https://siguza.github.io/APRR/
“We work hard to make our engine secure. We don’t think anyone else should try.”
“But here’s a security issue in your engine. Can I use this other one which I think does a better job? Can I even try?
“No.”
FWIW, W^X is generally implemented by all good JITs these days because it’s a good idea. I’m sure the if given the opportunity browsers would adopt this, just like they’ve adopted sandboxing on macOS despite there being zero documentation or support for that interface. It’s just that Apple does not even allow them to do so on iOS. (Also, W^X does mot protect against all buffer overflow attacks.)
I'm a neophyte on security issues, but this seems like a very open ended assertion.
Doesn't JIT require rwx permission on a block of memory? Haven't there been thousands of security attacks over the years that started with some kind of buffer overflow (or similar approach) that is fundamentally enabled by rwx permission on a block of memory? Like I said, I'm just an observer in this area, so apologies if I am way off base.
>is literally designed for low resource consumption instead of than performance
I would say this is the right choice for a handheld device. At least it is for my phone.