Re:US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack
by rckoepke on Monday May 10, 2021 @12:17AM
(#27102628)
Generally the controls are firewalled from the administrative/business systems, not air-gapped.
Production data (like gallons per minute of flow through the pipeline) must be sent from the controls to the business analytics software. That's generally done through a firewall over TCP/IP.
Re:US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack
by mysterydip on Monday May 10, 2021 @06:51AM
(#27104567)
I've seen systems where data is sent via UDP and the physical connection was transmit-only (for example, only the transmit fiber plugged in to the port) to avoid potential firewall exploitation.
Re:US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack
by DrPhish on Monday May 10, 2021 @01:40AM
(#27103066)
Often that kind of reporting data is delivered back via a “data diode” unidirectional network. That said, there is usually just a dmz between biz and prod to enable remote support of the controls system (ala the Purdue model), and not any real air gap.
Re:US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack
by daniellarusso on Monday May 10, 2021 @06:53AM
(#27104578)
…and the controls still have internet access, but it is NAT’ed, and it still has a fresh copy of Internet Explorer 9.
I have only witnessed this once, at a wastewater treatment plant, so very anecdotal.
Re:US passes emergency waiver over fuel pipeline cyber-attack
by frombody on Monday May 10, 2021 @01:40PM
(#27108658)
I've worked on these systems, they are separate.
They likely could have kept running the pipeline without incident.
I imagine when the government stepped in they decided to dial their procedures up to 10 and they plan on making an example out of this incident and the perpetrators.
Obviously not as bad as an actual compromise of the control systems though, which presumably could cause leaks, explosions, etc.