c.f. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-first-party-cookies-0... and https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-west-first-party-cookies-0...
Excerpts (draft 2):
> If "document" is a first-party context, and "request"'s URI's origin is the same as the origin of the URI of the active document in the top-level browsing context of "document", then return "First-Party".
vs. (draft 3)
> A document is considered a "first-party context" if and only if the registerable domain of the origin of its URI is the same as the registerable domain of the first-party origin, and if each of the active documents in its ancestors' browsing contexts' is a first-party context.
I think (and this might just be an old wive's tale) it was related to the browser connection limits being per domain, and so subdomains + looser cookie origins was a band aid for it.
It's basically an origin, but disregarding subdomains.
localStorage and IndexedDB on the other hand are most useful for frontend only stuff that the server doesn't need to ever see, and for large chunks of data that you do not want to send with every request, and app-domain specific caches that would be awkward to implement using regular browser caches or ServiceWorkers.
[0] For example, cloudflare implements their "browser checks" anti-DDOS-protections by setting some token in a cookie so your browser isn't hit with that check page on every navigation (at least in theory, TOR users and a lot of VPN users have different experiences). Since the browser will automatically manage and maintain such a cookie, the actual websites behind cloudflare do not need any changes whatsoever to their code.
1. cookies can prevent js access (httpOnly flag)
2. cookies can enforce https only (Secure flag)
I suppose the other thing you can do with cookies is use cookie prefixes. __Host probably makes no sense in the context of localStorage/sessionStorage anyway though, since they're all tied to the exact domain.
Having HttpOnly set only buys you so much, too. Sure, you can't steal the session from an XSS vector but your code can still do AJAX queries as the victim, potentially set up a JavaScript shell that works whilst the tab is open...
Be careful with assuming SameSite fully protects from CSRF attacks. I thought it does, but then I read what "site" actually refers to in the context of same site (eTLD+1).
If the eTLD+1 (i.e. company.com) is not listed on the Public Suffix List, even SameSite=strict cookies for a.company.com will still be sent for requests initiated from b.company.com