Unix-like OS in 80s-90s truncated passwords to 8 bytes, hashed in MD5 and stored them to regular file `/etc/passwd`. And in those era it was estimated to take six months to few centuries to brute force a password, therefore it was recommended to maximally complicate the password within 8 letters in length, and change it every one half the brute forcing time, or three months. Supposedly everything made sense in that timeframe in that context.
https://inbox.vuxu.org/tuhs/[email protected]/
https://fossbytes.com/unix-co-founder-ken-thompsons-bsd-pass...
[1] https://github.com/dspinellis/unix-history-repo/tree/BSD-3-S...
In the era when password hashes were still readable to everyone in /etc/passwd (this was later fixed by storing the passwords instead in a shadow file called /etc/shadow which can only be read by root), it was not MD5, but "crypt" (a DES variant). AFAIK, the MD5 and newer password hashing schemes don't truncate the password to 8 bytes, only traditional "crypt" did that.
If you're infiltrating a company, most people's accounts certainly don't give you the level of access required to bypass the need for passwords entirely. You'd have to be specifically hacking a sysadmin's account or something.
There are very many different levels of "compromised" and they're not all the same.
That being said, I agree with the overall premise that password rotation is outdated.
it's the latter, not the former. once you're compromised, passwords, changed or not, are no longer an obstacle at all.
password rotation does not increase security.