I mean, it's still altruistic because they're going to 'lose wealth' by donating. You're never going to earn back in tax write-offs as much as you spent by donating.
from the guys who brought you "the spectre patch in the kernel thats disabled by default" and "ignore your doubts, hyperthreading is still safe" comes "the incredible patch built solely around shareholder confidence and breakroom communication"
EDIT: spectre, not meltdown. oops.
https://www.theregister.com/2018/11/20/linux_kernel_spectre_...
I'm not sure to what you are referring to here.
I was one of the people who worked on the Linux PTI implementation that mitigated Meltdown. My memory is not perfect, but I honestly don't know what you're referring to.
> The whole IBRS_ALL feature to me very clearly says "Intel is not serious about this, we'll have a ugly hack that will be so expensive that we don't want to enable it by default, because that would look bad in benchmarks".
Live by the SPEC, die by the SPEC
Coordinating disclosure around security issues is hard, especially with a project like Linux where you have an extremely intricate mixture of long-term support kernels, vendor trees and distributions to deal with. Companies who maintain security-critical components really need to ensure that everyone knows how to approach this correctly, otherwise we end up with situations like this where the disclosure process actually increased the associated risks.
(I was part of Google security during the timeline included in this post, but wasn't involved with or aware of this vulnerability)