If computers that you build are quantum,
Then spies of all factions will want 'em.
Our codes will all fail,
And they'll read our email,
Till we've crypto that's quantum, and daunt 'em.
And Volker Strassen responded at a conference: To read our E-mail, how mean
of the spies and their quantum machine;
Be comforted though,
they do not yet know
how to factorize twelve or fifteen.
Source: http://www-math.mit.edu/~shor/notapoet.htmlLuckily there are asymmetric algorithms which are are secure against quantum computers, so we don't have to resort to quantum-key-exchanges.
When it comes to metered data, a few megabytes to access a new site sounds like normal internet to me. And you could use a trusted proxy/VPN; there are present-day apps that more or less fill that niche already.
A trusted proxy works if ECC is secure (no quantum computers), but if quantum attacks are practical then there would be no way to verify that the trusted proxy is actually what you think it is.
If you wait a small number of years you'll be able to get twice the ram at the same price. So "it would barely fit in ram if nothing else is running" doesn't seem like a significant barrier to me.
> A trusted proxy works if ECC is secure (no quantum computers), but if quantum attacks are practical then there would be no way to verify that the trusted proxy is actually what you think it is.
Your trusted proxy would be using one of the secure multi-megabyte keys, of course. Am I missing something about that arrangement? If signatures would also be enormous then we have a more significant problem to deal with than key size.
Also, my understanding is that almost all of these factorizations utilize a "compiled" version of Shor's algorithm. Meaning that you need to know the factors in advance. So it's essentially "confirming" rather than "finding" the factors.
According the first link in my post, the numbers bigger than 21 were chosen to have specific mathematical properties and attacked with algorithms even less realistic that compiled Shor.
There are claims of bigger factored numbers, but they exploited special cases (e.g. factors differing by only two bits) and have no hope of being extended to attack cryptography.
https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/59795/largest-int...
A 2019 paper manged to factor 21 on a 16 qubit ibmqx5, but failed to go up to 35:
> the algorithm fails to factor N=35. This is due to the cumulative errors coming from the increasing number of two-qubits gates necessary to implement the more complex MEF needed for this case
https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.00768