For example: You have a group with 100 Members, do you encrtpy each message you send 99 times for each recipient? Not likely. So you use a send key that everyone else can decrypt.
But then what if the group changes? Does everyone has to replace their send-keys, because the party that left can still decrypt all those messages otherwise.
That means you have to do n-1 key exchanges whenever a party leaves or joins. Otherwise it wouldn't be secure anymore.
There are some clever ideas about key exchanges, but so far the messengers that implement them are not widely used and since there is no profit in it, no one is in a hurry to compete.
No multi device support.
No transcoding for video.
No shared history for group chats.
Scaling get progressively harder with increasing participants.
That's an issue with your client and protocol, not with e2e
> No shared history for group chats.
Same
> Scaling get progressively harder with increasing participants.
Same
> No transcoding for video.
Now that's a more palpable issue. Also no size reduction of photos which is probably more used as a media.
That's issue with distributing the keys among multiple parties.
> No shared history for group chats.
> Same
Exactly. What's e2e good for, if you give keys to the entity that does the archiving?
All those issues are protocol-related. E2E only stipulates that the message can't be read between the two ends, it doesn't say you can't send a technical message for making a better UX.
Re-sending parts of the chat kind of removes the guarantees of the secret chat (just like backups defeat the purpose of e2e). These apps have also expiring and non-screenshotable messages, you don't want to resend that.
Ideally, all messages sent should be only decryptable by given set of keys (i.e. one key for each device used by each party of the chat; or, depending on the size of the message, ephemeral key used for message encryption, decryptable by each device that is supposed to receive it). Now the key distribution is the non-solved part.
Now, secret chats don't necessarily mean "this message can only be read by one device". To answer your second paragrah I disagree: a message shouldn't be sent to a given set of keys but to a given set of participants. Each participant may have one or more devices and should be able to read messages whatever way they want.
Also key distribution is "solved" by not counting on the user to do it but doing it for them: see what Matrix, Signal, Deltachat, XMPP (OMEMO) and probably others are doing.
That the user won't see on his device any messages sent before enrolling the new key? That's the point. Otherwise, the user should use the normal/non-e2e messages.
Thus, the key distribution as it is "solved" is being lax with them.
Is this true? From anecdata every e2e encrypted platform I used is much lower quality than the alternatives (iMessage, Signal, etc). Things like multi-device sync don’t work that well. Is this really just a coincidence? Telegram claims they can’t provide the same quality chat (and snappy cross platform crispness is really their competitive advantage) with e2e. Is this just a fake limitation?
The other bigger drawback with E2E is that the servers of those platforms don't store the chats permanently (they store it for about 30 days or so to deliver the messages to devices when they come online, depending on the platform). So syncing chat history across devices gets affected by this choice (it could still be done, but the complexity and speed of syncing grows a lot).
Wire does E2E for all chats and syncs all chats across devices. But it too doesn't sync chat history on newer linked devices. It also took the (what I consider as inferior) choice of using Electron for its desktop apps, which makes it quite sluggish.
Not true: Matrix is fine with storing messages permanently