Re:Vitalik escalates ETH 2.0 merge as miners plan a 51% attack
by shawnz on Saturday March 13, 2021 @08:21AM
(#26446358)
The incentives of the miners are aligned with the users: The miners mine and then they get paid.
If the incumbent miners stop mining in protest of their future profits declining, then new miners will just come in to take the profits they are refusing to collect today. There is no incentive for them to conspire and every incentive for them to not conspire.
Re:Vitalik escalates ETH 2.0 merge as miners plan a 51% attack
by delaaxe on Saturday March 13, 2021 @06:01AM
(#26445768)
Does something like delegated/nominated proof of stake solve this?
Re:Vitalik escalates ETH 2.0 merge as miners plan a 51% attack
by mratsim on Saturday March 13, 2021 @04:44PM
(#26450281)
Delegated proof-of-stake is worse than Proof-of-Stake or Proof-of-Work from a decentralization perspective as the "delegators" can bribe their way to stay in power.
Some resources (they link to DPoS alternatives and discuss them):
- https://vitalik.ca/general/2016/12/29/pos_design.html
- https://vitalik.ca/general/2017/12/17/voting.html
This is pretty similar situation. Incentives of the miners are not aligned with those of the users.