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A comment on Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files and the runtime. Parent comment

Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by Slartie on Thursday March 04, 2021 @04:46PM (#26348848)
Not if your SSD delivers data at more than 2500MB/sec, as the one in the MacBook Air with M1 does. SHA256 calculation can probably be performed at that speed as well, thanks to dedicated silicon, so even a large 250MB binary (haven't seen those in any other use case than browsers) would be hashed in a tenth of a second. Not noticeable at all, if it's just once, at startup.
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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by saagarjha on Thursday March 04, 2021 @06:23PM (#26349953)
This also sounds like something that could be cached if the file doesn’t change.
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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by codetrotter on Thursday March 04, 2021 @06:40PM (#26350128)
I think there is no good way of doing that. Each time the user tries to run a x86_64 binary you’d have to actually checksum, or otherwise check the content of, the x86_64 binary to know if you have a translated version of it already.

inode meta data such as timestamps are insufficient I think. They can be tampered with.

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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by derefr on Thursday March 04, 2021 @07:37PM (#26350738)
> inode meta data such as timestamps are insufficient I think. They can be tampered with.

In macOS, there is a security-policy layer of some kind on top of xattrs, separate from the security-policy of the file itself. `com.apple.rootless` is an example of an xattr protected by this mechanism: users (even root) can't apply or remove `com.apple.rootless` from files on a filesystem mounted as the rootfs.

With this mechanism, it'd likely be possible to give executable binaries an xattr containing the checksum, generated by Gatekeeper+Rosetta, that the user couldn't modify, while still being able to otherwise modify/delete the file. (And, presumably, modifying the file would automatically invalidate/remove the checksum xattr.)

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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by saagarjha on Thursday March 04, 2021 @09:36PM (#26351820)
The kernel is aware when files are modified.
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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by anyfoo on Thursday March 04, 2021 @10:52PM (#26352428)
That's not generally applicable, e.g. not if files are on an external drive, or worse, a network filesystem (where they can change even during use).
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Re:Reverse-engineering Rosetta 2 Part 1: Analyzing AoT files... by saagarjha on Saturday March 06, 2021 @06:32AM (#26366742)
In which case falling back on a hash is fine.
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