Recently I had to wipe my phone without being able to get the serial number information from the bnet app. It was kind of a pain, but I had to actually scan and send in an image of my drivers license for them to release the old authenticator from my account so I could attach a new one.
Think about that. An online gaming company is more secure about account authorization than a lot of banks are.
Blizzard pays support costs when player's accounts get hacked and are motivated to keep the players as happy paying customers.
Many banks seem to regard deposit holders as merely some kind of annoying obligation necessary to participate in FDIC programs (and occasionally as a source of absurd fees).
It is overall saddening that Blizzard, a game company, protects user data better than a bank. HOWEVER note that this happened in 2009. I doubt Blizzard was this secure back then. Also iPhone and Android were not as big then as they are today, and they were more up-and-coming than anything.
Blizzard offers the best of both worlds in my opinion: the authenticator is cheap/free and optional so you can choose how secure you want your account to be. Though, as noted, it's expensive for Blizzard to restore all the hacked accounts so they have incentives (free Corehound pet, for example) if you opt-in to have an authenticator on your account.
In this case, the plaintiff is asking the bank to assume liability because he got hacked. That's a bit of a stretch.
In these agreements, Patco "agreed to, among other things, assume all liability and responsibility to monitor its commercial checking account (“Account”) on a daily basis. See Modified eBanking Agreement § XIII.B; ACH Agreement §§ 11 and 12(a). Patco further agreed that it would indemnify Ocean Bank from any suits arising from its failure to abide by the terms of the Modified eBanking Agreement and the ACH Agreement"
(Source - Defendant's Answer to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Counterclaims - pg 10 - retrieved from http://www.buckleysandler.com/Patco_v_Peoples(1).pdf)
This is one of those situations where the many pages of fine print came back to bite an innocent victim. The bank did not have adequate security, but they came armed with abundant proof that Patco violated its terms of service. I am Canadian, so I don't know a huge amount about US civil law, but I'm pretty sure that the US has a mitigation requirement on any torts. Patco would have violated this.
I've got to tell you, reading that .pdf makes me want to keep my money under my mattress.
The part I find the funniest is that the judge actually agreed that the bank's security was lax, yet still dismissed because Patco was in violation of the agreements.
I wonder how many new business customers Ocean Bank has signed up since this suit went public? The good old free market is (hopefully) doing its thing.
The bank cannot be expected to be aware of normal transactions conducted with a fraudulent intent. Assuming they take some precautions (like they do if the suddenly see 15 quick purchases from Russia when you live in Oregon), there's only so much liability they can be expected to shoulder.
The point isn't that the bank should be universally responsible for fraud. It's that the responsibility for fraud does not end exactly at the login prompt.
Your bank (a decent bank presumably) obviously gives a shit about this because they want customer loyalty which comes with not getting identity stolen and they don't want to pay up. However that is not the law.
There is no industry wide law that requires statistical analysis on financial transactions as a anti-fraud methodology. Frankly this bank may get hit with people pulling business from them because they don't protect their clients, but that is another story.
Banks, after all, pushed online banking with minimal client protections because it was cheaper than paying staff.
The risks may have been minimal when online banking rolled out, but the world has changed significantly in the last five years. The client is not secure, and it is borderline unreasonable to expect them all to be in this day and age. Pretty much any client machine will fall to a persistent targeted attack. Two factor authentication should be mandatory for electronic transfers outside of the institution.