I'm always suspicious of the number of blogspam generic linux help advice sites that get you to install some random ppa complete with a nifty little code snippet that automatically installs certs and updates your sources.list! How handy!
https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2016/04/detecting-curl-pipe-b...
You can make it so that the server returns benevolent looking code when auditing it with just "curl URL", but return malware when curl is directly piped to bash.
I love using sites like that for my personal computer/projects, but I never copy and paste code snippets or install PPAs on work machines or computers with magic internet money on them
Aren’t they very easy to exploit, for a mildly dedicated actor? I don’t see any decent solution to this. Any line could contain a wget | bash...
Or you can not, and work to control your supply chain. Host the artifacts yourself and choose carefully which ones you use.
There is no magic bullet, just boring and painful risk-control processes. But they do help.
Wayland, SELinux, Flatpak, PipeWire. These will save us or at least reduce the problem of evil maintainers.
This model has been tried and proven for over a decade on mobile. What we call malware on mobile is simply the app doing bad things with what you enter in to the app itself and not the desktop class "steals all your data and then encrypts it"
If the sandbox is configured by the same person or organization that writes the code there's no improvement in trust.
That's why package maintainers have a role in Linux distributions.
There is no way around having to trust somebody else.
Maintainers do not have the time or ability to check for even intentional malware let alone security bugs.
Debian does very extensive vetting of the contents of packages - and of the volunteers who get to become Debian Developers.
What this means is that the package maintainer is unable to alter the binary/package outside of the publicly available sources.
In the case of the web extension, the maintainer could build whatever software they wanted, not necessarily the source you see on github or elsewhere. A reproducible build system would prevent this type of attack (that I'm talking about here).
I like gardening my small personal home server, services and backups but there is no reason debian packages could not be subject to the same supply chain "evil maid" or upstream "evil new maintainer". Everything being done in the open and reviewed makes it less probable, but not impossible. Sigh.
As a company, "risk" is mostly insurance. As an individual, it’s anxiety.