From matt levine:
>This means that the seller takes two days of credit risk to the buyer. I see a stock trading at $400 on Monday, I push the button to buy it, I buy it from you at $400. On Tuesday the stock drops to $20. On Wednesday you show up with the stock that I bought on Monday, and you ask me for my $400. I am no longer super jazzed to give it to you. I might find a reason not to pay you. The reason might be that I’m bankrupt, from buying all that stock for $400 on Monday.
>Generally if you buy a stock on Monday you still want it on Wednesday; even if you don’t, we live in a society, and you’ll probably cough up the money anyway because that’s what you’re supposed to do. But at some level of volatility things break down. If a stock is really worth $400 on Monday and $20 on Wednesday, there is a risk that a lot of the people who bought it on Monday won’t show up with cash on Wednesday. Something very bad happened to them between Monday and Wednesday; some of them might not have made it. You need to make sure the collateral is sufficient to cover that risk. The more likely it is that a stock will go from $400 to $20, or $20 to $400 for that matter, the more collateral you need.
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-01-29/reddit...
But the counterparty risk here is quantifiable (by way of audits of said retail trading platform) which usually in society makes it a case for insurance, not security payments. That is my question. Is the premise misstated, and if not, why is this not settled by insurance?
The three replies posted to the question above seems to disagree what the problem actually was.
That being said the collateral doubles as a sort of insurance; if one party's collateral is insufficient to cover the loss, the excess is spread across other market participants. This is one reason why client funds can't be used for this collateral.
IMHO the DTC and prime brokers are all pals playing in the same fixed game. My baseless assumption is they’re manipulating the market by selling uncovered shorts to each other and since everyone is in on it / accustomed to it, no one ever comes to collect so there’s no risk of having to cover their uncovered shorts. They could be shorting 2000% of the float and no one would know if all the trading happens between complicit participants with the sole intent of driving share prices down.
As far as I understand, no one is allowed to trade on stock exchanges directly. Everyone has to go through a broker. Orders has to be settled in 2 days. So there are counterparty risks involved in both steps here. Is this where there was a problem? But the retail trading platform takes zero financial risk as long as they don't allow their customers to trade on credit (which is an entirely different issue).
As a retail customer I am entirely confident that I own whatever stocks has been purchased, even if the trading platform used should go belly up, as long as the stock in question is traded in a public exchange, which was the case here.
So what exactly was the problem? Some posts led my to believe Robin Hood and other apps extended some credit to its users in order for customers to be able to speculate immediately with their money and not have to wait for the trade to be settled. But surely the appropriate response to that would be to halt that credit, not suspend trading?
There is also the question how it is possible to limit buys or not sells? For every sell there is also a buy. If some platforms are limited to sell orders, someone must be on the other side of that trade, and will have an advantage in the market. How is that legal?
Or did this not concern stock trading at all? Some articles mentions options trading, which is a financial instrument issued by a counter party. But those kinds of orders are stopped all the time for all sorts of reasons. That is in itself hardly newsworthy.