As with this incident, operators were physically present. That seems to be the real lesson (even if - see other war stories on this thread - operators tend to themselves have a creative approach to network security).
The attack worked exactly as designed - wasting time, destoying equipment while being stealthy. Had the attack tried to destoroy all equipment at once" it would have beem spotted immediately.
My point is, physically-present operators did spot AN issue immediately. It wasn't properly attributed to malice for months, sure, but they could still mitigate during that time.
Without their presence, would you (as attacker) really bother with all the stealthiness? It certainly hasn't seemed to avoid long-term attribution. Set the controller to +INF RPM and let whoever pours over the logs in the morning spit out their coffee.
And the target system also had security systems well beyond the capability of your local water treatment plant. Let's not forget that these assets deemed as critical infrastructure could be the target of nation states.
All I'm saying is that not being connected is only a small part of security for industrial systems, and that some people wrongly rely on it being enough.