> No good; people working for the Iranian state will DM.

They'll probably try, but it's not very scalable. It's tough to build and maintain a Twitter account with a history that looks like a real regular person, much less create a bunch of them fast with history that dates back before the day you started. If most of them make a modest effort to verify users, most of them should remain unblocked. It's all pretty decentralized, so it's not that big as deal if a few of them do get discovered and blocked.

People working for the Iranian state generally would be discernible from their Twitter account, and by controlling the information you hand out you can also flag the hidden accounts that aren't easily recognized.

You also overestimate how committed Iran is to stopping this. Doing this in public risks the state finding out, but outside of times of crisis the state is usually pretty slow to respond. Keeping it private tanks participation rates.

There are about 700,000 people of Iranian descent in the Los Angeles area alone (the largest such community in the US). Most of them are in the US to escape the regime, and most of friends and family in Iran who they keep in touch with. The people in Iran also have their own networks.

So a down-low friends and family approach could reach a lot of people.

If you just filter the amount of those 700,000 down to how many are aware Signal exists, I bet we'd already be at a low enough number to see the problem with your plan.

There are plenty of people that don't have friends of family in Iran but would still like to help.