The truth is perhaps more like this: agility got us to the moon, bureaucracy trapped us in low earth orbit, agility seems to be offering our best hope at getting back out of LEO again, including to Mars.
For example, see https://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240112230/Interview-Fro...
The Saturn-Apollo program had a super-heavy lift rocket (Saturn V), a man-rated heavy lift rocket (Saturn IB), a Lunar trajectory capable command and service module, a lunar lander, and a workable wet workshop space station (Skylab).
Congress tossed all of that away. The Space Shuttle program wasn't a bad idea, a heavy lift vehicle that provided a shirt sleeve environment but could support EVA is actually an awesome thing for LEO. But Congress scrapping Saturn-Apollo trapped NASA in LEO because the Shuttle was only capable of LEO. It's not a platform that can support manned Moon missions let alone any more distant bodies.
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_Applications_Program
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manned_Venus_flyby
It would have changed the face of power generation at a critical time for climate change if it was allowed to reach fruition. Instead it was locked away in UTC & NASA archives.
An external neutron source does not greatly change the needed enrichment (since any practical subcritical reactor would still need k fairly high, so it is only a bit subcritical.)
The terrestrial reactor and the rocket engine versions are different in how they transmit power from the reactor core to do useful work but not radically so - the core irrotational vortex compressing a high temperature plasma in a single crystal beryllium oxide chamber is the same in both designs and has been tested. The difference is in the cooling gas - hydrogen gas seeded with tungsten nanoparticles to absorb the black body radiation of the plasma for the rocket and water going through a steam turbine for terrestrial power generation.
It would have made some sense to incrementally improve some parts of that architecture (like the Saturn 1B, for example) rather than going down the Shuttle rabbit hole.
The shuttle did make sense for some things it was never used (DoD influence there) and it was an incredible piece of technology. It was also the workhorse for a big part of the ISS. But then again, that all happened in LEO, and different things could have been achieved by just iterating over Apollo/Saturn, in LEO and further away.
Blaming everything always on the congress/president is a way for NASA to never take responsibility. All the success gets credit to NASA but failure is always somebody wrong doing.
Simple changes like not going for hydrogen, separating main engines from Shuttle itself, not using hydrogen on the first stage, vertically mounted shuttle and so on.
I was making a commentary more of what I see the difference between NASA vs SpaceX's approach today. I wasn't around for Apollo, and given their crazy compressed timeframe for getting to the moon back then, there must have been some agility there....
I was really agreeing with the previous commenter, which I guess is a statement about today, and not how NASA operated in the 1960s...
> SpaceX learns by doing, not by years of expensive analysis that ends up not preventing failure anyway.
My mistake for invoking the Agile vs Waterfall debate... (and potentially being wrong!)
They launched a new mission every few months!
Apollo burned downed and killed the crew, the next Apollo was up a few months later! The second moon mission was launched a few months after the first.
1960's NASA was a little bit like SpaceX.
That said - we should remember that Space X is iterating on already established tech, at somewhat of a smaller scale. They started smaller. Let's see how it works with their newer, bigger gear that is breaking boundaries.
SpaceX's approach also deals with the real problem, which is a program having the wrong goals, rather than making mistakes in working toward a given goal. How many of you have built a product that ended up working great, but was a failure because it was the wrong product?