The root of trust is the private key that comes with the operating system install ISO, but that you can download over HTTPS or have it delivered as physical media etc.
This is not a universally correct assumption.
How does this chain of trust bootstrap for a first time (or stand alone) user who downloads Ubuntu from a non-Ubuntu system? If I've got MITM, I can change both the ISO (with the totally-not-verified public key) as well as the gpg sig to match using a private key I know (and gave you the public key to).
Sure, most nation states can craft whatever TLS cert they want, with only some risk of bad press if they get caught signing a ubuntu.com TLS cert fraudulently via a CA they control/coerce. If those people are my adversary I'm screwed. "YOU'RE STILL GONNA GET MOSSAD'D UPON!"
A TLS connection for the download (and the gpg signature) protects against people like the disgruntled hotel IT guy, the kid futzing with the cafe wifi, an evil housemate, some crappy rooted IoT shit somebody hooked up to the wifi, an overly curious coworker or corporate IT drone, the red team in a company pen test.
I've heard the arguments here - that it's a difficult problem for all the mirror operators to add ssl certs, that it'll stop downloads being cacheable, etc. But I didn't really buy those arguments 5 years ago, and these days, with LetsEncrypt and HSTS - I think those arguments are even more bogus than they were in 2015...
https://ubuntu.com/download/desktop
links to https://ubuntu.com/download/desktop/thank-you/?version=20.10...
http://archive.canonical.com/dists/xenial/Release.gpg
Yeah, I believe I see a problem there...