For example, on iPhone you can invoke an HTTP(s) URL, your app will exit, mobile safari opens, and you can then login and know that what you are typing is as secure as the OS/app sandboxing is....take a look at how the Facebook iPhone SDK flow works, its actually quite nice and very easy for users.
In reality, if you want to know that you aren't giving your username/password to a malicious third party, as an end user, you have to deal with a little inconvenience...being redirected in your browser to an SSL page that you trust, for example.
In this threat model, OAuth is practically a security no-op and a huge usability negative.
I trust the intent of many app developers, I just don't trust their competence to store my credentials securely. So OAuth still requires me to trust their intent, but does solve the problem of competence (as long as I trust them to implement OAuth properly which can also be an issue).
Clients using xAuth don't store username/password, anyways. They just use it once to request a token, every future request is just like normal OAuth.
No, its dramatically different. If someone has my password then they have full authority over my account right up to and including changing the password itself. If they have an OAuth token they have whatever limited rights I granted to the token (could be read only, or limited to a subset of data, or automatically expiring after 24 hours).
The analogy that is often used is the special set of valet keys that come with some cars. They allow someone to drive the car - but no faster than 20mph, cannot use stereo, etc. etc.
Yes there is. I don't trust the developer enough to give her/him my user ID and password so OAuth works for me.