People usually start off by debating the principles related to spying, surveilance, backdoors, especially in China related articles. Once the fact that most likely Intel CPUs or Windows can be safely considered "backdoored" is brought up, those same people pivot to "who backdoored it matters".

No, it does not. A backdoor is a backdoor and once it's out there it will sooner or later be used by everyone with enough resources, making the "who" irrelevant. Any Windows or Intel backdoors are very likely now in the hands of all major intelligence services around the world.

But let me frame it in a different, albeit slightly crass way: if you have a turd floating in your soup can you honestly say there's a good answer for "who put it there?" that will make you like that soup more?

> a cpu backdoor is not akin to a crouton

Of course not, croutons are generally appreciated, while backdoors are only appreciated by ignorant people, hackers, spies, and dictators.

> your stupid example

That's harsh given that you don't even seem to have processed what the example was conveying:

> you ate it right up until the moment you realized it

So then let's try again: once you realize the turd is there will knowing it's Russian, Chinese, or from the US make a difference on whether to keep eating or not? On whether to complain or not? Because GP claiming "Backdoored by whom is an important real-world distinction" suggests you, the customer, keep eating and don't complain if you like the answer.

I find the analogy to be reasonably valid.

> Backdoored by whom is an important real-world distinction.

Not really. Once something is backdoored by X, it can be accessed not only by X, but also by anyone who managed to hack into X. This is one of the main objections against adding backdoors (no matter how they are named, a backdoor doesn't stop being a backdoor just because you named it a "front door") to cryptographic protocols; even if you try to somehow make it so only "good guys" can use the backdoor, the "good guys" can be compromised (through technical or social means) by the "bad guys".

As an example, many telephony systems around the world have backdoors meant to be used only by local police. In a well-known case in Europe (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004%E2...), these backdoors were exploited by agents of a foreign country.

I would rather have a device with zero back doors, obviously.

But given that my present choice can only be between devices that are backdoored by the intelligence services of democratic nations with strong rule of law, or authoritarian regimes, and there is no third option, the choice is clear.

if you are a regular person of no interest for politicians, your been choice is a backdoor from the least influential agency

so if you are Chinese you better stick with American security, if you are American you might consider chinese/Russian security etc

Given the choice should a western civil rights activist or whistleblower prefer a device "backdoored by the intelligence services of democratic nations" or one backdoored by despots perpetually at odds with the west?

Even a slight glance at modern history will quickly tell you what would be in the best interest of these heroes.

China's draconian laws can't touch me unless I leave the soil of this authoritarian democracy, which I'm quite critical of and has a long history of persecution. To tell the truth, I prefer Chinese backdoors to domestic ones -- as China will be reluctant to share keys to those backdoors with the government that has physical access to me.

China's security services have no qualms about extorting foreigners on foreign soil. You don't know how you're vulnerable.

If China is able to snatch me up off US soil, that’d be quite an achievement.

I said extortion, not kidnapping. And it has happened.

In the real-world on a 5 year time horizon it is better to be backdoored by foreign governments than local governments. There is a much higher range of things law enforcement can do to abuse the backdoor than some group of foreigners.