...and a binary at all should not be able to be downloaded from the internet or pass through and email server. Additionally the only binary files running on any system should be known binaries. Least Privileged systems with tight change control don’t get hacked.

> Least Privileged systems with tight change control don’t get hacked.

As often.

Senior leadership would take an incredibly dim view when this inevitably shuts down accounting and purchasing after they can't use their PDFs and other executable-code documents anymore.

I was the CISO for a major bank for 16 years...year two of my tenure we completed the Least Privilege model and ran without a hitch...to this day.

presumably he opened a pdf with a zero-day from an untrusted source

and that untrusted source could look a lot like his superior's email ([email protected] vs [email protected])

And depending on the resources of the hacker, the email could be stylised just for him, talking about something important that's (perhaps something bad) happening now and the notBoss is telling him to check this months info, and kindly providing him with a pdf that Mathew hastily opens with his latest version of Adobe Acrobat with a zero day vulnerability that hasn't been discovered yet.

It could also be literally anything.

Yeah agreed, combining social engineering with technical exploits and you can get really good results. I almost fell into one trap myself one day: Basically I was having an argument with a service provider, and somehow I received an email talking about the same type of issue (just high level, without the minute details) with a link attached. I had to check it many times to make sure that it was a fraud email...

Presumably he opened an Office document containing macros. Macros are able to execute system commands and load malicious PowerShell code.

Executable files are blocked by pretty much all corporate e-mails systems. Zero-days for PDF viewers are rare. After all, most hacking attacks are things like ransomware campaigns, where everyone is a potential victim and phishing mails are sprayed all over the internet. A zero-day would be burnt pretty quickly.

However, many users legitimately need office macros and also need to open office documents to collaborate with contractors or customers. Many times, the phishing mail comes from a legitimate address because the other company has been compromised already.

The solution would be to only allow signed macros, but depending on the size of the organization, that can be costly.

Matthew in accounting should be given an ipad pro instead of a laptop or pc, with a glued in lightning cable that can only do power.

^ This is the solution I have been mulling if and when I am responsible for an org where security is kinda important. Sure, iOS is still hackable, but hopefully we put more hindrance steps between the attacker and the org, and move the exposure more to the cloud services (like box). Curious if this is feasible.

99.9% of Matthews-in-accounting use Microsoft Excel on Windows. Full stop.

Excel in windows is still possible, it'll just be on either an rdp server locally or on AWS.

And then when you run the xlsx file with the contaminated macro or zero-day, the result is exactly the same.

Matthew wouldn't want to work at your shit company then.

Why is that a mark of a shit company exactly? Because we should continue allowing a threat model that continues to plague essential services like hospitals with "ransomware", the fact that such a threat is allowed to continue suggests we need to take a hard look at how much we should take highly customisable computers for granted in work situations.

Who's this fucking Matthew and why is everyone talking about him? He must be the best heckin Accountanant ever

A magnetic lightning connector glued in should do fine[0], but if your threat model really takes into account checkm8, you could also just buy the newest ipad which will have a patched SecureROM.

0: https://www.amazon.com/REDDOTMOBILE-Detachable-Magnetic-Ligh...