Personally, I think if they actually announced a $100,000,000 prize they would be breached within a week on the outside. At $100,000,000 people can burn dozens to hundreds of zero-days to be the first to get the payout and still come out ahead. Even at $10,000,000 I doubt they would last more than 1 month. At $10,000,000 the prize would be the most attractive bounty in the entire industry by a factor of 3-10x and people could still burn some zero-days and still come out ahead.
No it wouldn't, because--
> the risk of getting unlucky
-- oh, you do understand. Why are you proposing this again?
I believe not a single cyber offensive op performed by a nation state had a budget of $1B. I'd say $1M is an upper bound here. Cyber warfare is used because it's cheap.
I doubt Stuxnet cost only $1M.
Licensing costs for law enforcement "remote access tools" (state trojans) can be millions (distributed among dozens of uses, but IMHO easy to see spending as much on a high-value single use).
From the wiki article about the iPhone-encryption debate: "On April 7, 2016, FBI Director James Comey said that the tool used can only unlock an iPhone 5C like that used by the San Bernardino shooter, as well as older iPhone models lacking the Touch ID sensor. Comey also confirmed that the tool was purchased from a third party but would not reveal the source,[59] later indicating the tool cost more than $1.3 million and that they did not purchase the rights to technical details about how the tool functions"
In this case they went after the tools to avoid detection and/or attribution in future ops. They could instead contract a company like their victim to develop such tools from scratch for about $10M.
Also, we're talking about nation states other than US.
So, what do we all think would be a level of resources that only a state could support? I think we can just start somewhere pretty low like $1,000,000,000. Fortune 500 companies and many criminal organizations could reasonably afford that, but the total number of organizations is still pretty limited, so it is probably a good lower bound. I do not think we can go much lower because if we drop down to $100,000,000 then even FireEye, which is not a Fortune 500 company, could theoretically fund such a venture with its revenue of $890,000,000.
Okay, so starting with "only a state" resource level of $1,000,000,000, we should probably divide it by 10 to make it highly unlikely people will do it just to prove they can even if it is unprofitable to get the prize. That leaves us with a simple open prize of $100,000,000 for the first person to demonstrate that they can breach their systems. If nobody claims the prize, then it is highly likely that this attack would take a state-level actor. If somebody does claim the prize, then it is probably doable by somebody who is not a state-level actor. This would provide an unbiased answer about the truth of their implications. If they think such a prize is too high, then they can just set it to a lower X that will give us an unbiased answer to the question: "Does it take more than X resources to breach their systems?"